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I. INTRODUCTION 
The cause of action for tortious breach of the implied cove­
nant of good faith and fair dealing has traced a spectacular tra­
jectory across the sky of California law, from its lift-off in 
Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance CO. l in 1959, to its 
zenith in Seaman's Direct Buying Service v. Standard Oil CO.2 in 
1984, to the curtailment of tort remedies in Foley v. Interactive 
Data Corp.3 in 1988, and culminating in the reversal of Seaman's 
in Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil CO.4 in 1995. Throughout 
this period, the potential for recovering punitive damages in con­
tract cases fueled an epic struggle in the California courts to de­
fine the nature and substance of the cause of action. 
1. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958). 
2. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984). 
3. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988). 
4. 11 Cal. 4th 85, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420, 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995). Freeman & Mills, 
Inc. announced "a general rule precluding tort recovery for noninsurance contract 
breach . ... " Id. at 102, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 430-31, 900 P.2d at 679-80. However, 
"nothing in this opinion should be read as affecting the existing precedent governing 
enforcement of the implied covenant in insurance cases." Id. at 103 , 44  Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
431, 900 P.2d at 680. 
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From the beginning, statutes of limitation have played an 
important role in defining the parameters of a claim for breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.5 As a 
result of this interaction between substance and procedure, how­
ever, the case law regarding the statute of limitation for breach 
of the implied covenant lies in considerable confusion. Several 
different statutes of limitation have been considered by Califor­
nia courts in an attempt to find the most appropriate limitation 
period for the cause of action.6 In addition, the task of choosing 
the proper statute of limitation has been complicated by the ef­
forts of insurance companies and others to shorten the limitation 
period by contractual modification.7 
In this article, we first will review the general principles ap­
plicable to classification of claims for limitation purposes and the 
various statutes which could be applied to breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. We then will examine 
cases in which the statute of limitation for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing was at issue and analyze 
what limitation period, rules of accrual and tolling doctrines are 
appropriate in the absence of contractual modification. Finally, 
we will analyze the extent to which contractual modification of 
the limitation period, rules of accrual and tolling doctrines has 
been permitted, and analyze what limits, if any, should be placed 
on such modifications. 
5. See, e.g., Comunale v. 1raders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 662-63, 328 P.2d 
198, 203 (Cal. 1958) (discussing election between tort and contract theories of liability 
and effect on the statute of limitation). 
6. See infra notes 29 -82 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra notes 141-230 and accompanying text. 
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II. CLASSIFICATION, ACCRUAL AND TOLLING IN THE 
AB SENCE OF CONTRACTUAL MODIFICAT ION 
A. Classification 
1. General Principles 
[Vol. 26 
The first step in answering any limitation question is to de­
termine which statute applies to the particular claim at issue.s In 
many cases, proper classification of the action is obvious, and the 
selection of the appropriate statute can be made without diffi­
culty. In other cases, courts may resort to the principle of statu­
tory construction that the more specific statute should be applied 
when there is a conflict with a statute of general application.9 
However, when a claim does not clearly fall within a particular 
statute, or when it appears to fall within more than one statute, 
neither of which is more specific than the other, potential plain­
tiffs can be misled, and a tremendous amount of time, money 
and judicial resources can be spent fighting over the proper clas­
sification of the cause of action for limitation purposes. 
8. The statutes of limitation which apply to civil actions generally are contained in 
Title II of the California Code of Civil Procedure. These statutes are divided into two 
major categories: Actions for the Recovery of Real Property (Chapter II) and Actions 
Other Than for the Recovery of Real Property (Chapter III). See CAL. CIY. PROC. 
CODE § 335 (West 1982). These limitation periods apply except "where. in special 
cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 312 
(West 1982). Statutes prescribing special limitation periods applicable to specific causes 
of action are scattered throughout the California codes. See generally California Stat­
utes of Limitation, 25 Sw. U. L. REV. 745 (1995). 
9. "In the construction of a statute . . .  when a general and particular provision are 
inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. " CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 1859 
(West 1982). "This rule applies to statutes of limitations and consequently a specific 
statute must take precedence over general statutes of limitation. " Comm. for a Pro­
gressive Gilroy v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 192 Cal. App. 3d 847, 859, 237 
Cal. Rptr. 723, 730 (Ct. App. 1987); accord, Loken v. Century 21-Award Properties, 36 
Cal. App. 4th 263, 272-73, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 683, 689 (Ct. App. 1995); Krieger v. Nick 
Alexander Imports, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 3d 205, 214, 285 Cal. Rptr. 717, 722 (Ct. App. 
1991); Estate of Mason, 224 Cal. App. 3d 634, 638, 274 Cal. Rptr. 61, 64 (Ct. App. 1990). 
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Unfortunately for practitioners, the Legislature has left little 
or no evidence of its rationale in enacting the original classifica­
tion scheme, and courts have not been able to discern any under­
lying policy or set of policies by which such classification 
problems can be solved. Indeed, the statutes purport to classify 
actions on at least four different bases: the nature of the remedy 
sought,lO the nature of the injury alleged,ll the identity or occu­
pation of the defendant,12 and the grounds or legal theory upon 
which the action is based.13 
Given the apparent absence of a coherent rationale or set of 
policies underlying the classification scheme, it is perhaps unsur­
prising that the California courts have failed to develop a mean­
ingful test to apply in deciding classification problems. In its 
most recent pronouncement on the subject, the California 
Supreme Court said: 
To determine the statute of limitations which applies to a cause 
of action it is necessary to identify the nature of the cause of 
action, i.e., the "gravamen" of the cause of action. "[T]he nature 
of the right sued upon and not the form of action nor the relief 
10. Compare CAL. CIy. PROC. CODE § 318 (West 1982) (action for the recovery of 
real property) and CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 338(a) (West Supp. 1996) (action upon a 
liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture) with CAL. CIY. PROC. 
CODE § 335 (West 1982) (actions other than for the recovery of real property) and CAL. 
CIY. PROC. CODE § 340(1) (West Supp. 1996) (action upon a statute for a penalty or 
forfeiture). 
11. Compare CAL. CIy. PROC. CODE § 340(3) (West Supp. 1996) (actions for, inter 
alia, injury or death caused by wrongful act or neglect of another) with CAL. ClY. PROC. 
CODE § 339(1) (West Supp. 1996) (action upon any obligation or liability not founded 
upon an instrument in writing). 
12. See, e.g., CAL. ClY. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982) (action for injury or death 
against a health care provider based upon professional negligence); CAL. ClY. PROC. 
CODE § 340.6 (West 1982) (action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission in 
the performance of professional services). 
13. See, e.g., CAL. ClY. PROC. CODE § 338(d) (West Supp. 1996) (action for relief 
on the ground of fraud or mistake). 
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demanded determines the applicability of the statute of limita­
tions under our code.,,1 4 
One problem with this statement is that it is contradicted in 
part by a legislative scheme that explicitly classifies some actions 
on the basis of the relief sought.1s Thus, when read in context, 
the quote appears to be nothing more than a restatement of the 
familiar proposition that the label attached to the cause of action 
in the pleading is not dispositive.16 
More fundamentally, however, a test based upon "the na­
ture of the right sued upon" or the "gravamen" of the cause of 
action provides virtually no guidance beyond the specific case in 
14. Hensler v. City of Glendale, 8 Cal. 4th I, 22-23, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 258, 876 
P.2d 1043, 1057 (Cal. 1994) (citations omitted), (quoting Maguire v. Hibernia Sav. & 
Loan Soc'y, 23 Cal. 2d 719, 733, 146 P.2d 673, 680 (Cal. 1944» . Accord, Jefferson v. J.E. 
French Co., 54 Cal. 2d 717, 718, 7 Cal. Rptr. 899, 900, 355 P.2d 643, 644 (Cal. 1960); see 
also Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 214, 1 Cal. Rptr. 12, 25, 347 P.2d 12, 25 (Cal. 
1959) ("the modem tendency is t9100k beyond the relief sought, and to view the matter 
from the basic cause of action giving rise to the plaintiff's right to relief . . . .  "). 
"Gravamen" is defined as "[t]he material part of a grievance, charge, etc." Wil­
liamson v. Pac. Greyhound Lines, 67 Cal. App. 2d 250, 252, 153 P.2d 990, 991 (Ct. App. 
1944); see also id. at 253, 153 P.2d at 992 ("gravamen, or essential facts or grievance as 
alleged"); BLACK'S LAW DlcrIONARY 701 (6th ed. 1990) ("[t]he material part of a griev­
ance, complaint, indictment, charge, cause of action, etc. The burden or gist of a 
charge; the grievance or injury specially complained of.") (citation omitted). 
15. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
16. See, e.g., Hensler, 8 Cal. 4th at 26, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260-61, 876 P.2d at 1059-
60 ("The gravamen of plaintiffs cause of action is therefore a claim that the Glendale 
ordinance is invalid on its face or as applied . . . .  regardless of the title attached to the 
cause of action or the remedy sought."); Hatch v. Collins, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1104, 11
,
10, 
275 Cal. Rptr. 476, 479 (Ct. App. 1990) ("Although the Hatches label their complaint 
'Breach of Fiduciary Duty . . .  .' we must disregard those characterizations for purposes 
of determining which limitations period applies."); Williamson, 67 Cal. App. 2d at 253, 
153 P.2d at 991 ("the character of the action is to be determined by the nature of the 
grievance rather than by the form of the pleadings.") (italics omitted) (citations omit­
ted); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532, 534 (9th Cir. 1992) ("To 
determine which statutory period applies, California courts look to the substance or 
gravamen of the complaint and the nature of the right sued upon rather than the cap­
tion of the complaint or the relief sought."), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 950 (1993). 
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which it is applied. In the absence of an underlying policy, how 
is a court to determine "the nature of the right sued upon" ex­
cept by assertion? In practice, California courts tend to deter­
mine "the nature of the right sued upon" by analogyP This 
method breaks down, however, when an analogy can plausibly 
be drawn to more than one of the causes of action for which a 
limitation period has expressly been provided. 
One of the difficulties in selecting a statute of limitation for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is 
that a number of plausible analogies to other causes of action 
can be drawn. First, because the covenant is implied into a con­
tractual relationship (which may or may not be in writing), it can 
be argued that the cause of action is "[a]n action upon a con­
tract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of 
writing," to which a two-year period applies.1s Second, the avail­
ability of punitive damages for certain breaches of the implied 
covenant19 supports the application of this statute on a different 
theory, since the statute applies' to most commercial torts as well 
as breaches of oral and implied contracts.20 Third, because the 
17. See, e.g., Augusta v. United Servo Auto. Ass·n. 13 Cal. App. 4th 4. 10. 16 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 400. 404 (Ct. App. 1993) (action for spoliation of evidence; holding "the situa­
tion in the case at bar presents a direct analogy to the two-year rule applicable to ac­
tions for interference with prospective economic advantage."). 
18. CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 339(1) (West 1982). Cf Foley V. Interactive Data 
Corp .• 47 Cal. 3d 654.690.254 Cal. Rptr. 211. 232. 765 P.2d 373. 394 (Cal. 1988) ("An 
allegation of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an allega­
tion of breach of an 'ex contractu' obligation. namely one arising out of the contract 
itself."). 
19. See, e.g., Egan V. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co . •  24 Cal. 3d 809. 819-24. 169 Cal. 
Rptr. 691 696-99.620 P.2d 141. 146-49 (Cal. 197Q) (upholding jury's decision to award 
punitive damages but reversing amount of punitive damages as excessive). 
20. See, e.g. , Eisenberg V. Insurance Co. of N. Am .• 815 F.2d 1285. 1292 (9th Cir. 
1987) (Section 339(1) "was enacted as 'a catch-all for unusual tort actions not otherwise 
provided for ... ·) (citation omitted); cf. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1996) (puni­
tive damages authorized "[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from 
contract . . . .  "). 
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covenant is implied into written contracts as well as' oral ones, -it 
can be argued that where the underlying contract is in writing, an 
action for breach of the implied covenant is "[a]n action upon 
any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument 
in writing," to which a four-year period applies.21 Fourth, be­
cause damages for emotional distress are available for certain 
breaches of the covenant,22 it can be argued that such breaches 
are actions "for injury to . . .  one caused by the wrongful act or 
neglect of another," to which a one-year limitation period ap­
plies.23 Fifth, because "bad faith" implies an element of dishon­
esty, it can be argued that an action for breach of the covenant is 
"[a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake, to 
which a three-year limitation period applies."24 Sixth, because 
the cause of action most frequently arises in the insurance con­
text, it can be argued that the one-year limitation period in the 
California standard form fire-insurance policy2S should be ap­
plied if such a provision is contained in the written contract, 
21. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337, subd. 1 (West 1982). See, e. g. , Comunale v. Trad­
ers & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 662, 328 P.2d 198, 203 (Cal. 1958) (" The promise 
which the law implies as an element of the contract is as much a part of the [written] 
instrument as if it were written out."). 
22. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, 66 Cal. 2d 425, 432-34, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 13, 18-19, 426 P.2d 173, 178-79 (Cal. 1967) (affirming award of damages for 
mental suffering for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). 
23 . CAL. CIv. PROC. CoDE § 34O(3) (West Supp. 1996). Cf Cantu v. Resolution 
Trust Corp., 4 Cal. App. 4th 857, 889, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151, 170 (Ct. App. 1992) ("Be ­
cause intentional infliction of emotional distress is an injury to the person, the applica­
ble statute of limitations is one year."). 
24. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338{d) (West Supp. 1996); cf. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 43 0, 
58 Cal. Rptr. at 16, 426 P.2d at 176 ("Several cases, in considering the liability of the 
insurer, contain language to the effect that bad faith is the equivalent of dishonesty, 
fraud, and concealment."). 
25. CAL. INS. CODE § 2071 (West 1993) ("No suit or action on this policy for the 
recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless . . .  
commenced within 12 months next after inception of the loss."). 
/ 
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either by statutory mandate (for fire-insurance policies)26 or by 
agreement of the contracting parties.27 Seventh, it can be argued 
that the cause of action for breach of the implied covenant is 
simply "[a]n action for relief not hereinbefore provided for," to 
which a four-year period applies.28 Faced with so many plausbile 
choices, it is not surprising that courts sometimes reached incon­
sistent results. 
2. Case Law Prior to 1986: Election of Remedies 
In the seminal case of Comunale v. Traders &' General In­
surance CO.,29 the California Supreme Court held that an action 
could be maintained against an insurer "who refuses to accept a 
reasonable settlement within the policy limits in violation of its 
duty to consider in good faith the interest of the insured in the 
settlement. "30 The court then went on to consider whether the 
newly-recognized cause of action was barred by the statute of 
limitation. The court noted that the complaint had been filed 
"less than four years but more than two years after the cause of 
action arose."31 Accordingly, the insurer argued that "an action 
on an implied obligation arising out of contract is not on the 
26. CAL. INS. CoDE § 2070 (West 1993) ("All fire policies on subject matter in Cali­
fornia shall be on the standard fonn . . . .  ") ; see Prieto v. State Fa nn Fire & Cas. Co. , 225 
Cal. App. 3d 1188, 1195 , 275 Cal. Rptr. 362, 365-66 (Ct. App. 1990) ("[W]e find neither 
reason nor authority to signify that a plaintiff's election to seek redress under the im­
plied covenant . . .  should nullify the legislatively prescribed limitation . . . .  ") . 
27. See, e.g., Frazier v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 90, 1 03 ,  214 
Cal. Rptr. 883, 890 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Metropolitan urges that if Mrs. Frazier is pe nnit­
ted to proceed upon a contractual theory , she is then bound by the time limitations 
contained in the insurance policy itself . . . .  "). 
28. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 344 (West 1982). 
29. 50 Cal. 2d 654 , 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958). 
3 0. ld. at 661 , 328 P.2d at 202. See also id. at 659, 328 P.2d at 201 (the insurer's 
"unwarranted refusal [to settle] . . .  constitutes a breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing."). 
31. ld. at 662 , 328 P.2d at 203. 
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written instrument,"32 and therefore that the two-year limitation 
period of section 339(1) applied, rather than the four-year limita­
tion period of section 337(1). The court rejected this argument, 
stating: 
The promise which the law implies as an element of the contract 
is as much a part of the instrument as if it were written out. [Ci­
tations omitted]. lraders relies on a statement in Scrivner v. 
Woodward, 139 Cal. 314, 316, 73 P. 863 [(Cal. 1903)], that 
'Promises merely implied by law, and not supported by any ex­
press promise or stipulation in the written instrument, do not fall 
within the provision of section 337, relating to contracts in writ­
ing.' This statement is too broad, and it was limited in O'Brien v. 
King, 174 Cal. 769, 774,164 P. 631 [(Cal. 1917)], as applying only 
to a quasi contractual liability.33 
The court's holding on this point is supported by the language of 
section 337(1), which reads (in relevant part): "[a]n action upon 
any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument 
in writing."3 4 This language appears to encompass an implied 
"obligation or liability" so long as it is "founded upon an instru­
ment in writing." 
Had the court ended the opinion there, it would have been 
clear that a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing was a contractual action, and that the 
limitation period to be applied depended only on whether the 
underlying contract was or was not in writing. However, the 
court went on to state: "Although a wrongful refusal to settle 
has generally been treated as a tort, it is the rule that where a 
case sounds both in contract and tort the plaintiff will ordinarily 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337(1} (West 1982). 
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have freedom of election between an action of tort and one of 
contract. "35 . 
This comment sowed the seeds of confusion over the nature 
of the cause of action for decades to come.36 Certainly it pro­
vided a hook on which the California Supreme Court could hang 
its subsequent decisions recognizing the availability of tort reme­
dies, including punitive damages, for breach of the implied cove­
nant of good faith and fair dealing.37 And it was the availability 
of tort remedies that led to proliferation in the number of claims 
and to efforts to extend the doctrine to contracts outside the in­
surance context.38 The availability of tort remedies also lent ad­
ded urgency to the efforts of defendants to try to defeat such 
claims by means of the statute of limitation. 
The implications of the dual nature of the cause of action 
for the statute of limitation was first confronted by a federal 
35. Id. at 663, 328 P.2d at 203 (citations omitted). See also id. at 661, 328 P.2d at 
202 (action is assignable "whether the action is considered as sounding in tort or in 
contract. "). 
36. See, e.g., Frazier v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 90, 100, 214 
Cal. Rptr. 883, 888 (Ct. App. 1985) ("The question whether an action . . .  for breach of 
[the] implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing . . .  sounds in tort or in contract is 
difficult to analyze in clear logical terms. In the words of the trial court 'it seems to me 
that the Courts have created a hybrid . . . .  "'). 
37. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, 66 Cal. 2d 425,432, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 13, 18,426 P.2d 173, 178 (Cal. 1967) (holding that "an action of the type involved 
here sounds in both contract and tort" and approving recovery of damages for mental 
suffering); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 578-80, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 488-
90, 510 P.2d 1032, 1040-42 (Cal. 1973) (approving recovery of damages for emotional 
distress); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 819-24, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691, 
696-99, 620 P.2d 141, 146-49 (Cal. 1979) (upholding jury's decision to award punitive 
damages but reversing amount of punitive damages as excessive). 
38. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 
206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984) (recognizing tort action for bad faith de­
nial of the existence of a contract and suggesting that breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in employment or commercial contracts might also give rise to an 
action in tort), overruled by, Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 11 Cal. 4th 85, 44 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 420, 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995). 
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court. In McDowell v. Union Mutual Life Insurance CO.,39 the 
insureds sued two insurance companies for, inter alia, bad faith 
refusal to pay benefits due under group medical insurance poli­
cies, and sought to recover damages for emotional distress and 
punitive damages. 4o The insurer argued that Code of Civil Pro­
cedure section 340(3), the one-year statute of limitation for per­
sonal injury, "embraces any wrongful act resulting in personal 
injury whether that act be a contractual breach or the violation 
of a tort duty" and should be applied to the bad-faith claims. 41 
The district court rejected this argument for two reasons. First, it 
relied on dicta in Comunale which indicated that the bad-faith 
cause of action was one "which relater s] to financial damage . . .  
[rather than one] for personal injury caused by negligence, 
where the tort character of the action is considered to prevail 
. . . .  " 42 Second, it noted that the California Supreme Court had 
permitted recovery of damages for emotional distress while 
reemphasizing the dual nature of the cause of action. 43 The 
court concluded: 
Since the bad faith cause of action sounds in both contract and 
tort . .. this court cannot say that the tort character of the action 
predominates .. The defendants' § 340(3) argument is rejected. 
Plaintiffs can properly found their bad faith contract claim on 
§ 337(1) and its four year statute of limitation provision.44 
39. 404 F. Supp. 136 (C. D. Cal. 1975). 
40. Id. at 138-39. 
41. Id. at 143. 
42. Id. at 144-45 (quoting Comunale v. 1raders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 663, 
328 P.2d 198, 2 02 (Cal. 1958)). 
43. Id. at 145 (citing Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 432, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 
18, 426 P.2d 173, 178 (Cal. 1967) (bad faith cause of action "sounds in both contract and 
tort")); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 573 , 1 08 Cal. Rptr . 480, 484, 5 1 0  
P.2d 1 032, 1 036 (Cal. 1973); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
9 Cal. App. 3d 5 08, 527, 88 Cal. Rptr. 246, 258 (Ct. App. 1970) (award for pain and 
distress "was proper even under a breach of contract theory. "). 
44. McDowell v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 136, 145 (C. D. Cal. 1975). 
However, the court did apply the one-year limitation period to the insured's separately 
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The court went on to hold, however, that if the insureds elected 
to sue in contract, they could not maintain a claim for punitive 
damages, noting that "the courts in California do not uphold 
awards for punitive damages in contract actions. " 45 On the other 
hand, if the insureds elected to bring their bad faith cause of 
action in tort rather than in contract, in order to preserve their 
punitive damage claim, then a different statute of limitation 
would apply. 46 The court explained, "[t]he gravamen of the bad 
faith cause of action in tort is the tortious interference with an 
intangible property interest," 47 and such a claim "is to be con­
trolled by the two year statute of limitations covering actions 
upon 'a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an in­
strument in writing. "' 48 The court acknowledged that Comunale 
had held that the four-year statute of limitation applied, and that 
there was a "respectable argument" that the four-year period 
should apply even when punitive damages were sought: 
[I]t would seem natural to conclude that the tortious bad faith 
cause of action is based upon an obligation founded upon a writ­
ten instrument and that a section dealing with obligations not 
founded upon a written instrument has no bearing. Moreover 
such a reconciliation of the sections would seem to comport with 
their underlying philosophy which appears to be that if there is a 
writing in permanent form evidencing the existence of an agree-
pleaded claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 147-48; accord, 
Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 83 Cal . App. 3d 38, 50, 147 Cal. Rptr. 565, 575 (a. App. 
1978). 
45 . McDowell, 404 F. Supp. at 145 (citing for support Crogan v. Metz, 47 Ca l. 2d 
398, 4 05, 3 03 P.2d 1029, 1 033 (Cal. 1956) }. 
46. Id. at 145-46 & n.7. 
47. Id. at 146 (citing for support Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 44 Cal. App. 
3d 358, 363, 118 Cal . Rptr. 581, 584 (Ct. App . 1975) }. 
48. Id. at 146 ( quoting CAL. CIv. PROC. CoDE § 339(1) (West 1982) }; see e.g., TU­
VU Drive-In Corp. v .  Davies, 66 Cal. 2d 435, 437, 58 Cal . Rptr. 105, 106, 426 P.2d 505, 
5 06 (Cal. 1 967). 
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ment and the terms and obligations thereof, it is appropriate that 
a longer statute of limitations apply.49 
On the other hand, the court also noted that Comunale had dis­
tinguished cases "where the tort character of the action is consid­
ered to prevail,"50 and that other cases had applied the two-year 
period to tort actions, even though the duty was founded upon a 
written contract.5l Consequently, since the action in McDowell 
was filed more than two years, but less than four years, after the 
alleged wrongful refusal to pay, the court granted the insurer's 
motion to dismiss or strike the claim for punitive damages.52 
Subsequent California cases have confirmed both aspects of 
the McDowell opinion. In Richardson v. Allstate Insurance 
Co. ,53 the California Court of Appeal rejected the argument that 
the one-year personal-injury statute of limitation applied to a 
bad-faith action alleging damages for emotional distress: 
The error in Allstate's reasoning is the assumption that a tort 
action against an insurer for bad faith is based upon an alleged 
interference with a personal right merely because mental distress 
is alleged. Breach of the implied covenant of good faith is action­
able because such conduct causes financial loss to the insured, 
and it is the financial loss or risk of financial loss which defines 
the cause of action. Mental distress is compensable as an aggra­
vation of the financial damages, not as a separate cause of 
action.54 
49. [d. at 147. 
5 0. See Comunale v. 1i'aders & Ge n. Ins. Co., 5 0  Cal . 2d 654, 663, 328 P.2d 203 
(Cal. 1958). 
51. McDowell, 404 F. Supp. at 147 (citi ng L.B. Lab., Inc. v. Mitchell, 39 Cal. 2d 56, 
63, 244 P.2d 385, 389 (Cal. 1952) (accounta nt malpractice) ;  Benard v. Walkup, 272 Cal. 
App. 2d 595, 600, 77 Cal. Rptr. 544, 547 (Ct. App. 1969) (legal malpractice) }. The Leg­
islature has since e nacted a specific statute of li mitation for legal malpractice actions. 
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.6 (West 1982). 
52. 404 F. Supp. at 147. 
53. 117 Cal. App. 3d 8, 172 Cal. Rptr. 423 (Ct. App. 1981). 
54. [d. at 13, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 426. The same conclusion was also reached in Eise n­
berg v. Insura nce Co. of N. Am. 815 F.2d 1285, 1291-92 (9th Cir. 1987), a case involving 
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Having decided that the action was timely filed as a tort action 
under the two-year statute, Richardson declined to decide 
whether it could also be brought under the four;.year statute.55 
In Frazier v. Metropolitan Life Insurance CO.,56 however, the 
court of appeal confirmed that the plaintiff "is at liberty to make 
an election" between an action in contract and an action in 
tort.57 
an alleged tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an employ­
ment contract. In Eisenberg, the employer cited Newfield v. Ins. Co. of the West, 156 
Cal. App. 3d 440, 203 Cal. Rptr. 9 (Ct. App. 1984), for the proposition that the one-year 
statute of limitation should apply. In Newfield, the court held that plaintiff had not 
stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge founded upon violation of public policy 
or a statute, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 443-44, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 11 ,  and further held that "any 
tort action would be barred by the one-year statute of limitations." Id. at 443, 203 Cal. 
Rptr. at 10. The Newfield court cited no authority, and Eisenberg correctly noted that 
"[t]his proposition is not embraced by the majority of California courts." 815 F.2d at 
1291 n.7. The Eisenberg court also noted that Newfield was followed on this point in 
Miller v. Indasco, Inc., 223 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Ct. App. 1986), review granted, 227 Cal. Rptr. 
390, 719 P.2d 986 (Cal. 1986); transferred with directions to vacate and reconsider, 264 
Cal. Rptr. 353, 782 P.2d 594 (Cal. 1989). See Eisenberg, 815 F.2d at 1291. In so doing, 
the Eisenberg court apparently overlooked the. fact that when review was granted, 
Miller was deprived of its precedential effect under California law. See CAL. R. Cr. 
976(d) (West Supp. 1996) ("Unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court, no opin­
ion superseded by grant of review, rehearing or other action shall be published.") See 
also CAL. R. Cr. 977(a) (West Supp. 1996) ("An opinion that is not ordered published 
shaH not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action or proceeding 
except as [otherwise] provided . . . .  "). 
Having rejected the one-year statute, Eisenberg held that the two-year period of 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CoDE § 339(1) applied to a tort action for breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. Eisenberg, 815 F.2d at 1292. Eisenberg was subsequently 
overruled on this point by Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1991). 
See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text. 
55. Richardson, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 14, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 427. 
56. 169 Cal. App. 3d 90, 214 Cal. Rptr. 883 (Ct. App. 1985). 
57. Id. at 101, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 889. The court of appeal also held that·plaintiff had 
not made an irrevocable election to sue in tort by checking the "tort" box in the certifi­
cate of assignment. Instead, it held "[a] person should be entitled to change his alterna­
tive remedies until one of his inconsistent rights is vindicated by satisfaction of 
judgment or by application of the doctrines of res judicata or estoppel." Id. 
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[Ilf [the plaintiff] chooses to proceed on a contract theory she is 
entitled to the four-year statute of limitations permitted by Code 
of Civil Procedure section 337, subdivision (1), when suing upon 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and for 
damages for emotional distress based upon such breach.58 
The court also adopted McDowell's holding that the two-year 
limitation period applied if the plaintiff elected to proceed on a 
tort theory,59 emphasizing that "if the tort cause of action is 
time-barred . . . plaintiff must proceed solely on her contract the­
ory; and she may not also proceed on the time-barred tort theory 
to obtain punitive damages. "60 Although the court recognized 
the inconsistency of permitting damages for emotional distress 
but barring punitive damages, it explained that "[w]e fail to find 
any California case allowing punitive damages when the com­
plaint is based only on a contract theory of action,"61 and con­
cluded that "pure logic must give way to the strict statutory 
prohibition of [Civil Code] section 3294 and case authority inter­
preting the statute . . . .  "62 
Thus, by 1986 it was relatively clear that plaintiff could 
make an election between contract and tort when suing for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
and that if a contract theory was chosen, the four-year statute 
would apply if the underlying contract was in writing; but if a 
tort theory was chosen (in order to provide the basis for punitive 
58. [d. at 102, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 889. 
59. [d. at 105-06, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 892. 
60. [d. at 107, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 892. The court also held that the action was not 
barred by the two-years-and-ninety-days limitation contained in the insurance policy 
itself. [d. at 103-04, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 890-91. This aspect of the decision is discussed in 
Part II below. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
61. [d. at 106, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 892 (italics in original). 
62. [d. at 107,214 Cal. Rptr. at 893. That section provides that punitive damages 
may be awarded "[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from con­
tract." CAL. Crv. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1996). 
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damages), the two-year statute would apply. Unfortunately, this 
apparent stability turned out to be transitory. 
3. Case Law After 1986: Changing the Nature of the 
Implied Covenant 
On November 4, 1986, three justices of the California 
Supreme Court were defeated in a recall election,63 and they 
were soon replaced by three justices appointed by then-Gover­
nor George A. Deukmejian.64 Overnight, the ideological com­
position of the court shifted from dominance by a liberal 
majority, which had consistently expanded the cause of action 
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
to dominance by a conservative majority, which was widely per­
ceived to be more pro-business and less pro-consumer.65 Within 
its first full term, the new majority immediately set about limit­
ing the scope of the cause of action for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,66 the California Supreme 
Court held that "tort remedies are not available for breach of 
the implied covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] in an em­
ployment contract to employees who allege they have been dis­
charged in violation of the covenant. "67 Although the court 
63. See Frank Clifford, Voters Repudiate Three of Court's Liberal Justices, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1986, at F8. The defeated justices were Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth 
Bird, and Associate Justices Joseph R. Grodin and Cruz Reynoso. Id. 
64. See Philip Hagar, Three New Justices of State High Court Sworn In, L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 19, 1987, at 1. The three new Associate Justices were John A. Arguelles, David N. 
Eagleson and Marcus M. Kaufman. Id. Former Associate Justice Malcom M. Lucas 
had previously been elevated to Chief Justice by Governor Deukmejian. Id. at 30. 
65. See, e.g., Philip Hagar, Dropped Cases Indicate Shift to Right by Court, L.A. 
TIMES, May 26, 1987, at F3. 
66. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988). 
67. Id. at 700, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40, 765 P.2d at 401; see also id. at 696, 254 Cal. 
Rptr. at 236-37, 765 P.2d at 398 ("[T]he employment relationship is fundamentally con­
tractual, and several factors combine to persuade us that in the absence of legislative 
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purported only to decide the question with respect to employ­
ment contracts, its broad language left little doubt that it in­
tended its holding to apply to all contracts except insurance 
policies, where the tort cause of action was already well­
established: 
An allegation of breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing is an allegation of breach of an "ex contractu" 
obligation, namely one arising out of the contract itself. The cov­
enant of good faith is read into contracts in order to protect the 
express covenants or promises of the contract, not to protect 
some general public policy interest not directly tied to the COD­
tract's purposes. The insurance cases thus were a major depar­
ture from traditional principles of contract law. We must, 
therefore, consider with great care claims that extension of the 
exceptional approach taken in those cases is automatically appro­
priate if certain hallmarks and similarities can be adduced in an­
other contract setting.68 
In the wake of Foley, two opinions have recognized that the 
California Supreme Court's renewed emphasis on the contrac­
tual nature of the cause of action has implications for the selec­
tion of the proper statute of limitation to be applied. In Krieger 
v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. ,69 the California Court of Appeal 
cited Foley and Frazier in holding that the plaintiff could elect to 
proceed on a contract theory in pursuing its third cause of action, 
labeled "Tortious Bad Faith Breach of the Covenant of Good 
Faith," and that therefore the proper limitation period was the 
direction to the contrary[,j contractual remedies should remain the sole available relief 
for breaches of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment 
context. If) . 
68. ld. at 690, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232, 765 P.2d at 394; see also td. at 683, 254 Cal. 
Rptr. at 227, 765 P.2d at 389 ("The covenant of good faith and fair dealing was devel­
oped in the contract arena and is aimed at making effective the agreement's 
promises."); id. at 684, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227, 765 P.2d at 389 ("Because the covenant is a 
contract term, however, compensation for its breach has almost always been limited to 
contract rather than tort remedies."). 
69. 234 Cal. App. 3d 205, 285 Cal. Rptr. 717 (Ct. App. 1991). 
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four-year period of section 337(1). '0 Likewise, in Harrell v. 20th 
Century Insurance CO.,71 the Ninth Circuit held that Foley had 
the effect of superseding the Ninth Circuit's previous holding in 
Eisenberg v. Insurance Co. of North America72 that "the Califor­
nia Supreme Court would most likely adopt section 339(1)'s two­
year limitations period to a claim for breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing."73 Since Harrell involved "a dispute 
arising from an alleged breach of a standard commercial contract 
for the sale of a business,"74 the court held that "the Harrell's 
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing presents a contract claim subject to the four-year statute 
of limitation applicable to written contracts set forth in Califor­
nia Code of Civil Procedure § 337(1)."75 
More recently, in Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil CO.,76 
the California Supreme Court overruled Seaman's Direct Buying 
Service v. Standard Oil CO.,77 a 1984 California Supreme Court 
decision which had recognized a cause of action in tort for bad 
faith denial of the existence of a contract,78 Seaman's had sug­
gested that tort remedies might be available for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contexts other 
than insurance, including employment and commercial con-
70. ld. at 220-21, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 726-27. 
71. 934 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1991). 
72. 815 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1987). 
73. Harrell, 934 F.2d at 207 (citing Eisenberg, 815 F.2d at 1291-92). 
74. Harrell, 934 F.2d at 208. 
75. ld. In light of its reliance on more recent California authority, Harrell should 
also be deemed to overrule other federal cases in which the two-year limitation period 
was applied to actions for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
in a non-insurance context. See, e.g., Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 871 F.2d 784, 793 (9th 
Cir. 1989); Crossen v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1076, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 
1982). 
76. 11 Cal. 4th 85, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420, 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995). 
77. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984). 
78. ld. at 769, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363, 686 P.2d at 1167. 
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tracts.19 Moreover, lest its message remain unclear, the Freeman 
court announced "a general rule precluding tort recovery for 
noninsurance contract breach, at least in the absence of violation 
of 'an independent duty arising from principles of tort law' other 
than the bad faith denial of the existence of, or liability under, 
the breached contract. "80 
Thus, in light of the California Supreme Court's return to 
the contractual principles underlying the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, it is now clear that the case law per­
mitting an "election of remedies" for breach of the implied cove­
nant, and the consequent election of the statute of limitation to 
be applied, no longer has any application outside the insurance 
context.81 Instead, the limitation period to be applied is either 
the four-year period, if the underlying contract is in writing, or 
the two-year period, if the underlying contract is oral or 
implied.82 
79. [d. at 768-69 & n.6, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63 & n.6, 686 P.2d at 1166-6 7 & n.6. 
80. Freeman, 11 Cal. 4th at 102, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 430-31, 900 P.2d at 6 79-80 
(citations omitted). The holding in Freeman obviously also has the effect of eliminating 
the need to determine which statute of limitation applies to the cause of action for bad 
faith denial of the existence of a contract. Cf Smyth v. USA A Property & Cas. Ins. 
Co., 5 Cal. App. 4th 1470, 14 76-77, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 697-98 (Ct. App. 1992) (applying 
two-year statute). 
81. Cf Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1136, 1144 n.4, 2 71 Cal. Rptr. 246, 
249 n.4 (Ct. App. 1990) (four-year statute of limitation applies to plaintiffs ' "claim for 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing insofar as it rests on the implied 
contractual promise," but two-year statute applies "[t]o the extent the Loves seek tort 
remedies on their claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing."). 
Moreover, in the insurance context, the issue of whether the plaintiff may choose the 
statute of limitation by means of an election of remedies has been almost entirely super­
seded by the insurers ' attempts to modify the applicable limitation period by contract. 
This issue is discussed infra Part III. 
82. Of course, in accordance with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 312, this general rule 
will not apply in contractual contexts where "a different limitation period is prescribed 
by statute." CAL. CN. PROC. CoDE § 312 (West 1982) . See, e.g., Loehr v. Ventura 
Community College Dist., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1071, 1079, 195 Cal. Rptr. 5 76, 581 (Ct. 
App. 1983) (one-year period of California Tort Claims Act applies to claims seeking 
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B. Accrual and Tolling 
1. General Principles 
Section 312 of the California Code of Civil Procedure pro­
vides: "[c]ivil actions . . .  can only be commenced within the 
periods prescribed in this title, after the cause of action shall have 
accrued . . . . "83 Once the proper period has been selected, the 
next step is to determine when the cause of action accrues.84 
It has been stated that "[i]n ordinary tort and contract ac­
tions, the statute of limitations . . .  begins to run upon the occur­
rence of the last essential element to the cause of action. "85 This 
statement, however, is a circular truism: it merely states that a 
person is not required to sue (and cannot be precluded from do­
ing so) until he or she is able to do so. In the absence of legisla­
tive guidance,86 the courts have created three major rules of 
damages against governmental entities "whether [the underlying action] sound[s] in tort 
or contract."); Ficalora v. Lockheed Corp., 193 Cal. App. 3d 489, 238 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Ct. 
App. 1987) (action for violation of Fair Employment and Housing Act subject to one­
year limitation period provided in Act; common law causes of action preempted). 
83. CAL. ClY. PROC. CODE § 312 (West 1982) (emphasis added). 
84. Section 312 "does not define that point at which the cause of action accrues." 
Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 191 n.30, 98 Cal. Rptr. 
837, 846 n.30, 491 P.2d 421, 430 n.30 (Cal. 1971). Moreover, "[t]he Legislature has 
enacted no statute which describes for each class of civil action, the date of accrual." Id. 
at 191, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 846, 491 P.2d at 430. Thus, when the statute does not specify 
when the cause of action accrues, "the Legislature has chosen to defer to judicial expe­
rience and to repose with the judiciary the rendition of rules for the accrual of causes of 
action." Id. at 192,98 Cal. Rptr. at 847, 491 P.2d at 431. 
85. Neel, 6 Cal. 3d at 187, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844, 491 P.2d at 428. 
86. California's first statute of limitation, enacted in 1850, specified the time of 
accrual for only one type of civil action: "[a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud," 
was "not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of 
the facts constituting the fraud." Act of April 22, 1850, ch. 127, § 17(4),1850 Cal. Stat. 
343, 345 (commencement of civil action); cf CAL. avo PROC. CODE § 338(d) (West 
Supp. 1996) (action for relief on the grounds of fraud or mistake). Since 1970, however, 
most newly-enacted statutes of limitation specify the time of accrual in addition to the 
period of limitation. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982) (medical 
HeinOnline -- 26 Sw. U. L. Rev. 22 1996-1997
22 SOUTHWESTERN UNWERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
accrual, whose applicability depends in part on the substantive 
law applicable to the cause of action: the "wrongful act" rule, 
the "damage" rule, and the "discovery" rule. 
Under the "wrongful act" rule, "a cause of action arises 
when the wrongful act was committed and not at the time of the 
discovery; the statute commences to run even though a plaintiff 
is ignorant that he has a cause of action. "87 This rule is most 
frequently applied in contract cases, where it is held that a cause 
of action for breach of contract accrues, and the statute of limita­
tion begins to run, at the time the breach occurs.88 
The "wrongful act" rule is consistent with the notion that a 
cause of action for breach of contract may be maintained even 
though the plaintiff suffered only nominal damages.89 Some­
times, however, the "wrongful act" rule of accrual can result in a 
cause of action being barred before the injured party suffered 
any appreciable damage. For example, if a plaintiff is exposed to 
a toxic substance, such as asbestos, that exposure may not result 
in cancer or other injury for many years. Thus, in tort ca�es, 
courts came to hold that "damage" is an essential element of the 
malpractice); CAL. CIV. PROC. CoDE § 340.6 (West 1982) (legal malpractice);  CAL. CIV. 
PROC. CoDE § 340.2 (West 1982) (exposure to asbestos). 
87. Myers v. Eastwood Care Ctr., Inc., 31 Cal. 3d 628, 634, 183 Cal. Rptr. 386, 389· 
90, 645 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Cal. 1982). 
88. See Spear v. Cal. State Auto. Ass'n, 2 Cal. 4th 1035, 1042, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 381, 
385, 831 P.2d 821, 825 (Cal. 1992) ("A contract cause of action does not accrue until the 
contract has been breached."); Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 
3d 205, 221, 285 Cal. Rptr. 717, 727 (Ct. App. 1991) ("In contract actions, the cause of 
action generally accrues at the time of the breach."); cf CAL. COM. CoDE § 2725(2) 
(West Supp. 1996) ("A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of 
the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach."). 
89. See, e.g., Xebec Dev. Partners, Ltd. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 12 Cal. 
App. 4th 501, 576, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726, 769 (Ct. App. 1993) ("if no injury were proved 
XDP . . .  would in any event be entitled to nominal damages for breach of the insurance 
contract. "). 
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cause of action, without which the plaintiff cannot sue.90 The 
practical consequence of this view is that "the statute of limita­
tion does not begin to run against a negligence action until some 
damage has occurred. "91 
Even under the "damage" rule of accrual, however, a cause 
of action may become barred by the statute of limitations before 
the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, a causal con­
nection between the alleged wrongful act and the injury. This 
can occur, for example, in toxic tort cases, where the plaintiff 
may suffer a disease or disability, but may not be aware that it 
was caused by exposure to a toxic substance until a much later 
date. Thus, courts developed a third rule of accrual, the "discov­
ery" rule, under which "the accrual date of a cause of action is 
90. "Unlike a contract action where the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment and nom­
inal damages without proof of actual damages, a negligence action may not be main­
tained in the absence of proof of actual, proximately caused damages." Garton v. Title 
Ins. & 1hJst Co., 106 Cal. App. 3d 365, 381, 165 Cal. Rptr. 449, 458 (Ct. App. 1980); see 
also Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 200, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852, 491 P.2d 433, 436 (Cal. 
1971) ("If the allegedly negligent conduct does not cause damage, it generates no cause 
of action in tort. "). 
91. Budd, 6 Cal. 3d at 200, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 852, 491 P.2d at 436; see also Davies v. 
Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d 502, 513, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705, 712, 535 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Cal. 1975) 
(tort action for breach of confidence) (citations omitted): 
[W)e have drifted away from the view held by some that the limitations period 
necessarily begins when an act or omission of defendant constitutes a legal wrong as 
a matter of substantive law. Rather, we subscribe to the view that the period cannot 
run before plaintiff possesses a true cause of action, by which we mean that events 
have developed to a point where the plaintiff is entitled to a legal remedy, not 
merely a symbolic judgment such as an award of nominal damages. 
Accord, Miller v. Bean, 87 Cal. App. 2d 186, 189, 196 P.2d 596, 598 (Ct. App. 1948) 
(action for breach of written covenant to protect title to property subject to deed of 
trust). 
The same result is achieved regardless of whether the "damage" rule is considered 
to be a rule of accrual or a tolling doctrine. Compare Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 
1103, 1 109, 245 Cal. Rptr. 658, 661, 751 P.2d 923, 926 (Cal. 1988) (describing "the com­
mon law rule, that an action accrues on the date of injury") with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 34O.6(a)(1) (West 1982) (action for legal malpractice is "tolled during the time that . . .  
[t]he plaintiff has not sustained actual injury."). 
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delayed until the plaintiff is aware of her injury and its negligent 
cause."92 The standard is one of inquiry notice: "Under the dis­
covery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the 
plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by 
wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong to her. "93 
2 .  Insurance Contracts 
Given the California Supreme Court's renewed emphasis on 
the contractual nature of the cause of action for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,94 one might as­
sume that the "wrongful act" rule should be applied, and that the 
cause of action should be deemed to accrue at the time the 
breach occurs. In most cases involving breach of contract, how­
ever, application of the "wrongful act" rule is consistent with the 
discovery rule, because the plaintiff "is easily aware that the con­
tract has been breached."95 On the other hand, where the plain­
tiff is justifiably unaware of the breach, courts have applied the 
discovery rule, even in a contract cases.96 Thus, although case 
law continues to maintain that the discovery rule is an exception 
92. Jolly, 44 Cal. 3d at 1109, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 661, 751 P.2d at 926-27. 
93. Id. at 1110, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 662, 751 P.2d at 927. 
94. See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text. 
95. April Enter., Inc. v. KTIV, 147 Cal. App. 3d 805, 831, 195 Cal. Rptr. 421, 436 
(Ct. App. 1983). 
96. See, e.g., id. at 832, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 437 ("we hold the discovery rule may be 
applied to breaches [of contract] which can be, and are, committed in secret and, more­
over, where the harm flowing from those breaches will not be reasonably discoverable 
by plaintiffs until a future time."); accord, Lee v. Escrow Consultants, Inc., 210 Cal. 
App. 3d 915, 923 n.5, 259 Cal. Rptr. 117, 122 n.5 (Ct. App. 1989); Evans v. Eckelman, 
216 Cal. App. 3d 1609, 1614, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605, 607 (Ct. App. 1990) (dictum); cf. CAL. 
COM. CODE § 2725(2) (West Supp. 1995) ("where a warranty explicitly extends to fu­
ture performance . . .  and discovery of the breach must await the time of such perform­
ance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered."). 
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to the traditional rules of accrual in contract and tort cases,97 a 
realistic assessment of the law of accrual as it is currently applied 
leads to the conclusion that the discovery rule is now the general 
rule of accrual for civil actions in California.98 
In insurance cases, breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing usually occurs in one of three ways: wrong­
ful refusal to pay benefits due under the policy; wrongful refusal 
to defend the insured against claims made against him or her 
under a liability insurance policy; or wrongful refusal to settle a 
claim against the insured under a liability insurance policy. Each 
of these will be discussed in tum. 
In a case of wrongful refusal to pay benefits, the breach 
could be deemed to occur when the contingent event giving rise 
to the contractual liability occurs.99 Thus, for example, for fail­
ure to pay benefits due under a life insurance policy, the breach 
could be deemed to occur when the insured dies. The insured's 
right to receive payment, however, does not necessarily mature 
upon occurrence of the conditional event; typically, the insured 
97. See, e.g. , Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 187, 
98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 844, 491 P.2d 421, 428 (Cal. 1971) (contrasting "ordinary tort and 
contract actions" with "cases of professional malpractice"). 
98. See Stephen V. O'Neal, Comment, Accrual of Statutes of Limitations: Califor­
nia's Discovery Exceptions Swallow the Rule, 68 CAL. L. REv. 106, 120 (1980) ("Adop­
tion of the discovery principle across the board would align judicial statements of 
accrual law with its actual application"); April Enter. , 147 Cal. App. 3d at 828-29, 195 
Cal. Rptr. at 434 ("We agree that as a result of judicial pronouncements, the discovery 
rule can be regarded as the general rule of accrual in many classes of cases in 
California. "). 
99. This is the effect of the limitation provision in the California Standard Form 
Fire Insurance Policy, which provides that "[n]o suit or action on this policy for the 
recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity . . .  unless 
commenced within 12 months next after inception of the loss." CAL. INS. CODE § 2071 
(West 1993). Although this statute applies only to fire insurance policies, most insur­
ance contracts contain a similar provision. The effect of these clauses will be considered 
infra Part III; the question posed here is what rule of accrual would be appropriate in 
the absence of a contractual or statutory provision. 
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(or the beneficiary) must submit a claim to the insurance com­
pany in a timely manner,lOO and the insurer must make a deter­
mination that no policy exclusions apply. Thus, most policies 
provide that the insured (or the beneficiary) is not entitled to 
receive pay�ent until a fixed time after the claim is submitted.lOl 
When the occurrence of a condition precedent is not within the 
control of the party claiming a breach, then the cause of action is 
not deemed to have accrued until the condition precedent is sat­
isfied.lo2 Accordingly, a cause of action for wrongful refusal to 
pay benefits under the policy should not be deemed to accrue 
until the insurer actually denies the insured's claim by refusing to 
pay benefits due under the policy.lo3 If, however, the insurer 
100. For example, the California Standard Form Fire Insurance Policy provides that 
"[t]he insured shall give written notice to this company of any loss without unnecessary 
delay . . . .  and within 60 days after the loss, unless such time is extended in writing by 
this company, the insured shall render to this company a proof of loss . . . .  " CAL. INS. 
CODE § 2071 (West 1993). 
101. For example, the California Standard Form Fire Insurance Policy provides: 
The amount of loss for which this company may be liable shall be payable 60 days 
after proof of loss, as herein provided, is received by this company and ascertain­
ment of the loss is made either by agreement between the insured and this company 
expressed in writing or by the filing with this company of an award as herein 
provided. 
CAL. INS. CODE § 2071 (West 1993). 
102. See, e.g., Williams v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 186 Cal. App. 3d 941, 949-51, 
231 Cal. Rptr. 234, 238-40 (Ct. App. 1986) (private right of action under Fair Employ­
ment and Housing Act does not accrue until Department of Fair Employment and 
Housing notifies claimant that it will not take action); see also 3 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFOR­
NIA PROCEDURE, AcnONS § 380 (3d ed. 1985) ("If the obligation of the defendant is 
conditional upon the happening of an event or the act of a third person, the cause of 
action does not accrue until that time."). 
103. See Frazier v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 90, 103, 214 Cal. 
Rptr. 883, 890 (Ct. App. 1985): 
Mrs. Frazier's action does not commence until Metropolitan denies her claim on the 
ground of suicide. Prior to such time Mrs. Frazier has a right . . .  to sit back and wait 
until denial of claim before urging bad faith. Because it is not until Metropolitan 
actually denies the claim on the ground of suicide that Mrs. Frazier can actually 
ascertain whether or not Metropolitan has acted in bad faith. 
Gf, Neff v. New York Life Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 2d 165, 170, 180 P.2d 900, 904 (Cal. 1947) ("it 
is apparent that defendant's above-quoted letter was an unconditional denial of liability 
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simply fails to act on the claim, then the cause of action should 
be deemed to accrue on the date that benefits are due under the 
pOlicy. 104 If no deadline for payment is specified in the policy, 
then the claim should be deemed to accrue when a "reasonable 
time" has passed after the claim has been submitted to the 
insurer . 105 
When liability insurance is involved, however, different con­
siderations come into play. The claim by the third party against 
the insured often will be the subject of litigation. Thus, if the 
insurer wrongfully refuses to defend the insured, there is the 
possibility that the limitation period for the insured's cause of 
action against the insurer could expire before the underlying liti­
gation is concluded.106 The insured would then be compelled 
either to forego his or her bad faith claim, or to sue the insurer 
while the underlying action is still pending. Litigating two law­
suits simultaneously, however, can raise a number of practical 
to the insured and gave rise to an immediate cause of action in favor of the insured."); 
McDowell v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 136, 147 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (measur­
ing limitation period from "the refusal to pay, which was alleged to be in bad faith"). 
104. This assumes, of course, that the time for the insurer's response, and therefore 
the date on which benefits are due, has not been extended by agreement of the parties. 
"[Ilf the insurer expressly extends the one-year suit provision during its claim investiga­
tion, the insurer waives its right to raise a timeliness defense to the insured's action." 
Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 690, 274 Cal. 
Rptr. 387, 397, 798 P.2d 1230, 1240 (Cal. 1990) (In such a case, the statute of limitation 
should begin to run when the extended deadline has passed). Similarly, if the insurer 
causes the plaintiff to delay filing suit by means of improper conduct, the statute of 
limitation could be tolled under the doctrines of fraudulent concealment or estoppel. 
Id. at 689-90, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 397, 798 P.2d at 1240. 
105. What constitutes a "reasonable" time would inevitably be the subject of litiga­
tion; however, in the absence of legislative guidance, the courts could hold that sixty 
days after proof of loss is presumptively reasonable by analogy to the statutory provi­
sion in the California Standard Form Fire Insurance Policy. See supra note 100 and 
accompanying text. 
106. See Lambert v. Commonwealth Land ntle Ins. Co., 53 Cal. 3d 1072, 1077, 282 
Cal. Rptr. 445, 447-48, 811 P.2d 737, 739-40 (Cal. 1991). 
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and legal problems.l07 For example, the suit against the insurer 
could alert the third-party claimant to information that might 
compromise the insured's defense in the underlying action. Sec­
ond, the insured might be forced to take inconsistent positions in 
the two lawsuits. lOS Third, if the insured is an individual or a 
small business, it is likely to be financially and emotionally im­
practicable for the insured to engage in simultaneous litigation 
to protect his or her rights.l09 
In Lambert v. Commonwealth Land Insurance Co., 110 these 
considerations led the California Supreme Court to hold that 
although a cause of action against an insurer for wrongful refusal 
to defend "accrues upon discovery of loss or harm, i.e., when the 
insurer refuses to defend, . . .  it is equitably tolled until the un­
derlying action is terminated by final judgment."ll1 The court 
reasoned that the duty to defend was a continuing duty, and that 
failing to equitably toll the claim "would allow expiration of the 
statute of limitation on a lawsuit to vindicate the duty to defend 
107. These problems are analogous to the problems faced by a client who discovers 
an attorney's malpractice while the underlying action is still pending. See generally 
'TYler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, Limitation of Legal Malpractice Actions: Defin­
ing Actual Injury and the Problem of Simultaneous Litigation, 24 Sw. U. L. REv. 1, 19-
23 (1994) (hereinafter Simultaneous Litigation). 
108. For example, in the underlying litigation the insured will necessarily take the 
position that the claim is without merit; however, in the bad-faith litigation against the 
insurer, the insured will want to take the position that the claim had sufficient merit to 
trigger the duty to defend or the duty to settle. 
109. See Lambert, 53 Cal. 3d at 1078, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 448, 811 P.2d at 740 (citations 
omitted) (emphasis in original): 
It is harsh to require an insured - often a private homeowner - to defend the 
underlying action, at the homeowner's own expense, and simultaneously to prose­
cute - again at the homeowner's own expense - a separate action against the title 
company for failure to defend. " [Tlhe unexpected burden of defending an action 
may itself make it impractical to immediately bear the additional cost and hardship 
of prosecuting a collateral action against an insurer." 
110. 53 Cal. 3d 1072, 282 Cal. Rptr. 445, 811 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1991). 
111. Id. at 1077, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 447, 811 P.2d at 739. 
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even before the duty itself expires."112 The court also empha­
sized that "the contract of insurance is unique in that the pur­
chaser seeks not commercial advantage, but rather peace of 
mind and security in the event of unforeseen calamity,"113 and 
concluded that it would be inequitable to require the insured "to 
simultaneously enforce rights under the policy and defend a 
costly and potentially devastating claim"114 at the insured's own 
expense.llS 
The same considerations apply to a cause of action for 
wrongful refusal to settle a claim brought against the insured by 
a third party. In Comunale v. Traders and General Insurance 
CO. ,116 the case in which the cause of action for wrongful refusal 
to settle was first recognized, the California Supreme Court 
stated that "[the] cause of action against the insurer arose on 
August 13, 1950, when the judgment in the [underlying] bodily 
injury action became final."117 This result can be justified on the 
ground that the insured is not injured by. the wrongful refusal to 
settle until a final judgment or settlement is reached under which 
the insured is liable for an amount greater than the settlement 
offer which was rejected.ns Such a holding would also be consis-
112. ld. 
113. ld. at 1081, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 450, 811 P.2d at 742 (citations omitted). 
114. ld. 
115 .  ld. at 1078, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 448, 811 P.2d at 740. 
116. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958). 
117. ld. at 662, 328 P.2d at 203. 
118. See Purcell v. Colonial Ins. Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 807, 814-15, 97 Cal. Rptr. 874, 
878 (Ct. App. 1971) (dictum) (stating that although "the wrong occurred when the de­
fendant refused to settle . . .  the statute would of course commence to run only when 
the total damages were determinable, i.e., when the amount of the pecuniary loss was 
finally fixed."); Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 799, 41 Cal. Rptr. 
401, 407 (Ct. App. 1964) ("The fact of damage would become fixed and the policy­
holder'S cause of action arise when he incurred a binding judgment in excess of the 
policy limits."); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 690, 319 P.2d 69, 75 
(Ct. App. 1957) ("the insured's cause of action arises when he incurs a binding judg­
ment in excess of the policy limit."); Larraburu Bros., Inc. v. Royal Indem. Co., 604 
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tent with those California cases which have held that a cause of 
action for wrongful refusal to settle may not be maintained in 
the absence of a judgment in excess of the policy limits against 
the insured.u9 Other California cases, however, have held or 
suggested that a judgment in excess of the policy limits is not a 
F.2d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 1979) ("the statute of limitations on [bad faith] claims . . .  
begins to run from the date of the final judgment. ") (construing California law); accord, 
2 CALIFORNIA LIABILITY INSURANCE PRAcnCE: CLAIMS AND LmGATION § 26.12 
(Cal. CEB rev. 1994) ("Although the insurer's breach of duty occurs when it unreasona­
bly refuses the settlement offer, the cause of action for failure to settle does not accrue 
until the insured suffers a binding judgment in excess of policy limits and damages can 
be ascertained.") Cf. lIT Small Bus. Fin. Corp. v. Niles, 9 Cal. 4th 245, 257-58, 36 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 552, 559, 885 P.2d 965, 972 (Cal. 1994) ("an action for attorney malpractice 
accrues on entry of adverse judgment, settlement, or dismissal of the underlying ac­
tion" because "ITI did not suffer 'actual injury' resulting from Niles's alleged malprac­
tice until it settled the adversary proceeding on unfavorable terms:"). This argument is 
even stronger in the insurance context, because the insured does not incur additional 
attorneys' fees as a result of the wrongful refusal to settle unless there is also a breach 
of the duty to defend. 
119. See Finkelstein v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 11 Cal. App. 4th 926, 930, 14 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 305, 307 (Ct. App. 1992) ("Since there was no judgment in excess of the policy limits, 
appellant's cause of action never matured."); Doser v. Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co., 101 Cal. 
App. 3d 883, 891-92, 162 Cal. Rptr. 115, 119-20 (Ct. App. 1980) (judgment in excess of 
policy limits is "a condition precedent to [an insured's] cause of action against the in­
surer"). This argument is also ·supported by the similar holding in Moradi-Shalal v. 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988), 
that a cause of action by a third-party claimant against an insurer for a violation of INS. 
CODE § 790.03 may not be maintained absent "a final judgment determining the in­
sured's liability . . . .  " Id. at 311, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 131, 758 P.2d at 73. In Moradi-Shalal, 
the Court overruled its prior holding in Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 
3d 880, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842, 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979) and held that no implied private 
right of action arises under the statute. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 292, 250 Cal. Rptr. 
at 118, 758 P.2d at 60. However, the court also held that its ruling would apply prospec­
tively only, and it therefore went on to clarify the holding in Royal Globe that such a 
claim "may not be brought until the action between the injured party and the insured is 
concluded." Id. at 305, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127, 758 P.2d at 69 (quoting Royal Globe). 
One of the policy reasons cited in favor of its holding was that "damages suffered by the 
injured party as a result of the insurer's violation . . .  may best be determined after the 
conclusion of the action by the third party claimant against the insured." Id. at 306, 250 
Cal. Rptr. at 128, 758 P.2d at 70. As noted below, however, subsequent cases have cast 
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prerequisite to maintaining an action for wrongful refusal to set­
tle.120 In light of the California Supreme Court's subsequent de­
cision in Lambert,121 the better rationale is that the cause of 
doubt over whether Moradi-Shalal's holding applies to common-law bad-faith claims. 
See infra note 120. 
120. See Camelot by the Bay Condominium Owners' Ass'n v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 27 
Cal. App. 4th 33, 48, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 354, 362 (Ct. App. 1994) ("there is no explicit 
requirement for bad faith liability that an excess judgment is actually suffered by the 
insured, since the reasonableness analysis of settlement decisions is performed in terms 
of the probability or risk that such a judgment may be forthcoming in the future"); iii. at 
47 n.6, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361 n.6 ("the breach of the insurer's obligation occurs at the 
time when it indulges in the unwarranted rejection of a reasonable compromise offer 
within the policy limits.") (quoting Critz, supra note 118, 230 Cal. App. 2d at 797, 41 
Cal. Rptr. at 401); Bodenhamer v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1472, 1476-79, 238 
Cal. Rptr. 177, 179-81 (Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting insurer's argument that a settlement or 
judgment against the insured is a prerequisite to insured's bad faith action against in­
surer); accord, 3 HON. H. WALTER CROSKEY ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: 
INSURANCE LmGATION en 12:340 (The Rutter Group 1995) ("The dictum in Camelot, 
supra, seems correct. An excess judgment should not be essential to a bad faith action 
based on unreasonable refusal to settle.") (emphasis in original). See also Isaacson v. 
Cal. Ins. Guarantee Ass'n, 44 Cal. 3d 775, 793, 244 Cal. Rptr. 655, 667, 750 P.2d 297, 309 
(Cal. 1988) (holding that CIGA is immune from common-law bad-faith claims, but 
holding that under CIGA's statutory duty to settle, "[t]he insured need not prove his 
actual liability on the underlying claim, and establishing a breach does not require a 
trial of the underlying action."). This argument is also supported by cases which have 
refused to extend to bad-faith claims by an insured the holding of Moradi-Shalal that a 
final judgment is a condition precedent to the now-disapproved cause of action for vio­
lation of INS. CODE § 790.03. These cases reason that "the duty of an insurer to its 
insured is more extensive than is its duty to a third party claimant." Bodenhamer, 192 
Cal. App. 3d at 1480, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 182; accord, Thicor Calif., Inc. v. Superior Court, 
220 Cal. App. 2d 880, 883-84, 269 Cal. Rptr. 642, 643-44 (Ct. App. 1990) (dictum); Con­
tinental Cas. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 219 Cal. App. 3d 111, 126, 268 Cal. Rptr. 193, 201 
(Ct. App. 1990); Carter v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. App. 3d 424, 427-28, 239 Cal. Rptr. 
723, 724-25 (Ct. App. 1987); Cal. State Auto. Ass'n, Inter-Insurance Bureau v. Superior 
Court, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1428, 1432-33, 229 Cal. Rptr. 409, 412 (Ct. App. 1986); contra, 
Interinsurance Exch. v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1439, 1443, 262 Cal. Rptr. 392, 
394 (Ct. App. 1989). 
121. See Lambert v. Commonwealth Land TItle Ins. Co., 53 Cal. 3d 1072, 1080, 282 
Cal. Rptr. 445, 449-50, 811 P.2d 737, 741-42 (Ct. App. 1991) (action for wrongful refusal 
to defend "accrues when the insurer refuses the insured's tender of defense, but is 
tolled until the underlying action is terminated by final judgment."). 
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action for wrongful refusal to settle accrues on the date the in­
surer refuses to settle, but that the limitation period is equitably 
tolled until an adverse judgment or settlement is entered in the 
underlying action.122 
3. Employment Contracts 
Only a handful of cases address the issue of when a claim 
for wrongful termination based on a breach of the implied cove­
nant of good faith and fair dealing accrues under California law. 
Although at first glance they seem to point in opposite direc­
tions, they are easily reconciled with each other and with prece­
dent regarding other types of wrongful termination claims. 
In Eisenberg v. Insurance Co. of North America,123 the 
Ninth Circuit held, in accordance with the discovery rule and 
federal statutory precedent, that "[a]n employer's liability for 
wrongful discharge commences upon notice of the employee's 
termination even though the employee continues to serve the 
employer after receipt of such notice. "124 Eisenberg is in accord 
122. However, because the policies underlying simultaneous litigation must be bal­
anced against the policies advanced by the statute of limitation (guaranteeing repose 
and avoiding deterioration of evidence), a cause of action for wrongful refusal to defend · 
or settle a claim against the insured should not continue to be tolled after entry of 
judgment while the underlying action is appealed. Cf Simultaneous Litigation, supra 
note 107, at 14-19, 23-26; Laird v. Blacker, 2 Cal. 4th 606, 615, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 551, 
828 P.2d 691, 692 (Cal. 1992) (cause of action for legal malpractice accrues upon entry 
of adverse judgment or order of dismissal in the underlying action and is not tolled 
during appeal); lIT Small Bus. Fin. Corp. v. Niles, 9 Cal. 4th 245, 258, 36 Cal. Rptr. 552, 
559-60, 885 P.2d 965, 972-73 (Cal. 1994) (reaffirming Lain£). 
123. 815 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1987). 
124. [d. (applying California law). See also Daniels v. FESCO Div. of Cities Servo 
Co., 733 F.2d 622, 623 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying California law) (wrongful discharge 
claim; no discussion of covenant of good faith); Crossen V. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 
537 F. Supp. 1076, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (construing California law) ("Here, the cause 
of action accrued no earlier than November 29, 1978, the date of plaintiff's termination 
letter") (emphasis added); cf Delaware State College V. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257-58, 
101 S. Ct. 498, 503-04 (1980) (federal TItle VII claim). 
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with a recent California case holding that a claim for wrongful 
termination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act and in 
violation of public policy accrues "at the time the adverse em­
ployment decision was communicated to her, not when it took 
effect. "125 
In Loehr v. Ventura Community College District,126 the 
plaintiff filed a complaint alleging six counts of wrongful termi­
nation, includtng "tortious breach of an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing."127 The court stated that "[a]s a gen­
eral rule, the date of accrual is the date the plaintiff incurred 
injury as a result of the defendant's alleged wrongful act or omis­
sion. "128 In a footnote, the court added: "We note here that 
plaintiff's first five causes of action accrued on May 5 ,  1980, the 
date on which his employment contract was allegedly termi­
nated. "129 No authority was cited, but May 5 was the day the 
Board voted to discharge the plaintiff,130 and there was no indi­
cation that plaintiff continued to work after that date, although 
he did request on May 12, 1980, that the Board reconsider its 
action and reinstate him. Loehr is therefore not inconsistent 
with the rule stated in Eisenberg. 
Similarly, in Shoemaker v. Myers,l3l the court held, in a case 
involving wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under 
the Government Claims Act, that "[u]ntil plaintiff was termi­
nated, he did not suffer appreciable harm sufficient to justify 
legal action."132 However, the opinion states that "[p]laintiff was 
125. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 4th 1710, 39 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 919 (Ct. App. 1995). 
126. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1071, 195 Cal. Rptr. 576 (Ct. App. 1983). 
127. Id. at 1077, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 579. 
128. Id. at 1078, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 580. 
129. Id. at 1082 n.7, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 583 n.7. 
130. Id. at 1077, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 579. 
131. 2 Cal. App. 4th 1407, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 203 (Ct. App. 1992). 
132. Id. at 1427, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 215. 
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tenninated on December 23 ,  1 981 , and this was upheld on de­
partmental review on January 11 , 1982. Plaintiff submitted a 
claim to the Department on March 25 , 1982 , within 100 days of 
termination. "133 Earlier in the opinion, the court also stated that 
the plaintiff "was fired for insubordination by Shuttleworth and, 
on an intradepartmental appeal, senior Department officials up­
held the tennination, which became effective January 11, 
1982. "134 Although the matter is not free from doubt (because 
• 
both possible dates were within 100 days of the filing of the 
claim), it appears from the language used by the court that the 
plaintiff continued to work while the tennination was being ap­
pealed, but that the cause of action was deemed to accrue on the 
date when the original "termination" occurred, rather than upon 
the date it became effective. Since this is analogous to receiving 
a tennination notice that takes effect on a later date, Shoemaker 
is also consistent with the rule stated in Eisenberg. 135 
4 .  Other Contracts 
As for claims of breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in other types of contracts, general princi­
ples of accrual should apply. Thus, in Krieger v. Nick Alexander 
Imports,136 the court held that a claim for breach of the implied 
covenant was brought under a contract theory, and noted that 
"[i]n contract actions the cause of action generally accrues at the 
time of the breach."137 The court also noted that the discovery 
rule was an exception to this principle; however, it held that the 
133. Id. (citations omitted). 
134. Id. at 1415, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 206-07 (emphasis added). 
135. A definitive resolution of this issue may be forthcoming. The California 
Supreme Court recently granted review in a case which distinguished the Eisenberg 
rule. See Romano v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (Ct. App. 1995), review 
granted, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 909 P.2d 327 (Cal. 1996). 
136. 234 Cal. App. 3d 205, 285 Cal. Rptr. 717 (Ct. App. 1991). 
137. Id. at 221, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 727. 
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discovery rule did not apply in the absence of a fiduciary rela­
tionship or similar duty.138 The court therefore granted sum­
mary judgment on this claim.139 
Although Krieger correctly recognizes that general princi­
ples of accrual should apply to claims for breach of the implied 
covenant, it is incorrect in limiting the discovery rule to cases in 
which a fiduciary relationship or similar duty exists. The discov­
ery rule is a general rule of accrual that should be applied in all 
cases in which a plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to 
discover the facts concerning his or her cause of action until a 
future time.l40 Thus, for example, the court in Krieger correctly 
held that the discovery rule applies to an action for breach of 
warranty of future performance under the Uniform Commercial 
Code.141 Krieger should also have held the same with regard to 
the related claim for breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
III. CONTRACTUAL MODIFICATION OF THE LIMITATION 
PERIOD 
A. Validity of Contractual Modification 
1. General Principles 
As noted above,142 most insurance policies contain a clause 
that limits the time within which an action may be commenced 
against the insurer. For example, California's Standard Form 
138. Id. at 221-22, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 727. 
139. Id., 285 Cal. Rptr. at 727-28. 
140. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text. 
141. Krieger, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 218, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 725. See CAL. CoM. CODE 
§ 2725(2) (West Supp. 1996) (emphasis added): 
A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved 
party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender 
of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future perform­
ance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such perform­
ance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered. 
142. See supra note 99. 
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Fire Insurance Policy143 contains the following clause: "No suit 
or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be 
sustainable in any court of law or equity . . .  unless commenced 
within 12 months next after inception of the loss. "144 Such a 
clause, if enforced, has two effects. First, it shortens the limita­
tion period from four years for an action upon a written instru­
ment145 to one year. Second, it changes the date of accrual of 
the limitation period from the date the contract was breached 
(i.e., the date the claim is denied) to the earlier date of the incep­
tion of the loss. 
The California Supreme Court first considered the validity 
of a contractual limitation clause in 1909. In Tebbets v. Fidelity 
& Casualty Co. of New York,146 the life insurance policy pro­
vided that "legal proceedings for recovery hereunder may not be 
brought before the expiry of three months from the date of filing 
proofs at the company's home office, nor brought at all unless 
begun within six months from the time of death. ''147 The court 
held that "a condition in a policy of insurance, providing that no 
recovery shall be had thereon unless suit be brought within a 
given time, is valid, if the time limited be in itself not unreasona­
ble. "148 The court reasoned that since a defendant may waive 
143. CAL. INS. CoDE § 2071 (West 1993). 
144. Id. The origin and purpose of this provision was described by former Chief 
Justice 'fraynor as follows: 
The short statutory limitation in the present case is the result of long insistence by 
insurance companies that they have additional protection against fraudulent proofs, 
which they could not meet if claims could be sued upon within four years as in the 
case of actions on other written instruments. Originally the shortened limitation 
periods were inserted into policies by insurers. Some courts declared such provi­
sions void as against public policy while other courts enforced them to protect free­
dom of contract. 
Bollinger v. National Fire Ins. of Hartford, 25 Cal. 2d 399, 407, 154 P.2d 399, 403-04 
(Cal. 1944) (citations omitted). 
145. CAL. CIV. PROC. CoDE § 337(1) (West 1982). 
146. 155 Cal. 137, 99 P. 501 (Cal. 1909). 
147. Id. at 138, 99 P. at 502. 
148. Id. 
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the statute of limitation as a defense to an action, a plaintiff 
should have "[the] right to waive a portion of the time granted 
by the statute for the commencement of an action. "149 Since 
"[t]he six months' period was not in itself unreasonable,"150 the 
court affirmed the dismissal of the action. 
The I:ule announced in Tebbets that a contractual limitation 
clause will be upheld if not unreasonable has consistently been 
reaffirmed.l5l Thus, in Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance 
Co. v. Superior Court,152 the California Supreme Court expressly 
upheld the validity of the limitation-of-suit provision in Califor­
nia Insurance Code section 2071: "Such a covenant shortening 
the period of limitations is a valid provision of an insurance con­
tract and cannot be ignored with impunity as long as the limita­
tion is not so unreasonable as to show imposition or undue 
advantage. One year was not an unfair period of limitation. "153 
149. Id. at 139, 99 P. at 502. 
150. Id. 
151. See, e.g., Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 
674, 683, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 393, 798 P.2d 1230, 1236 (Cal. 1990); Fageol Truck & Coach 
Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 748, 753, 117 P,2d 669, 672 (Cal. 1941); Beeson v. 
Schloss, 183 Cal. 618, 622, 192 P. 292, 294 (Cal. 1920); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. 
Superior Court, 210 Cal. App. 3d 604, 608-09, 258 Cal. Rptr. 413, 415-16 (Ct. App. 
1989); Lawrence v. W. Mutual Ins. Co., 204 Cal. App. 3d 565, 571, 251 Cal. Rptr. 319, 
322 (Ct. App. 1988); C & H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 163 Cal. App. 3d 1055, 1064, 
211 Cal. Rptr. 765, 769-70 (Ct. App. 1984). 
152. 51 Cal. 3d 674, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal. 1990). 
153. Id. at 683, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 393, 798 P.2d at 1236, quoting C & H Foods, 163 
Cal. App. 3d at 1064, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 769-70, quoting Fageol, 18 Cal. 2d at 753, 117 
P.2d at 672. Prudential added that "[w]hen a clause in an insurance policy is authorized 
by statute, it is deemed consistent with public policy as established by the Legislature." 
Prudentia� 51 Cal. 3d at 684, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 393, 798 P.2d at 1236 (citation omitted). 
Conversely, where the Legislature has fixed a minimum limitation period by statute, a 
shorter contractual limitation period will be deemed invalid. Cf Hayman v. Sitmar 
Cruises, Inc., 14 Cal. App. 4th 1499, 1505, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412, 415 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(maritime contract; "the challenged limitations clause is not reasonable because it effec­
tively shortens the time to institute suit, in violation of [46 U.S.c. Appx.] section 
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The principle that a contractual limitation clause will be up­
held unless there is "imposition or undue advantage" suggests a 
congruence with the doctrine of unconscionability. California 
Civil Code section 1670.5,154 enacted in 1979, "codified the es­
tablished doctrine that a court can refuse to enforce an uncon­
scionable provision in a contract. "155 Unconscionability has 
been defined as "an absence of meaningful choice on the part of 
one of the parties together with contract terms which are unrea­
sonably favorable to the other party."156 The leading California 
case elaborated on this definition as follows: 
[U]nconscionability has both a "procedural" and a "substantive" 
element. The procedural element focuses on two factors: "op­
pression" and "surprise." "Oppression" arises from an inequality 
of bargaining power which results in no real negotiation and "an 
absence of meaningful choice." "Surprise" involves the extent to 
which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hid­
den in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to en­
force the disputed terms . . . .  No precise definition of substantive 
unconscionability can be proffered. Cases have talked in terms 
of "overly harsh" or "one-sided" results .... [But] "unconsciona-
183b."); CAL. CoM. CoDE § 2725(1) (West 1996) ("By the original agreement the par­
ties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year . . . .  "). 
154. If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the con­
tract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may re­
fuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract 
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any 
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
CAL. CIY. CODE § 1670.5(a) (West 1985). 
155. Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 925, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345, 353, 702 
P.2d 503, 511 (Cal. 1985). The Perdue court noted that "[s]ection 1670.5 is based upon 
Uniform Commercial Code section 2-302, but expands coverage to include noncommer­
cial contracts." Id. at 913 n.10, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 353 n.10, 702 P.2d at 511 n.10. 
156. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 486, 186 Cal. Rptr. 
114, 121 (Ct. App. 1983), (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 
445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965» . 
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bility turns not only on a "one-sided" result, but also on an ab­
sence of "justification" for it.,,157 
39 
The case law concerning the enforceability of contractual 
limitation provisions is remarkably similar to this definition of 
unconscionability. In practice, courts have enforced contractual 
limitation periods because of an absence of unfair surprise158 and 
because of the presumed substantive reasonableness of the one­
year period.159 Consequently, the only California court to ad­
dress the issue has held that "[t]he enactment of [Civil Code] 
section 1670.5 expands our scrutiny of limitation of actions pro-
157. A & M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 486-87, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121-22 (citations 
omitted). In Perdue, the California Supreme Court approved this analysis "an alterna­
tive analytical framework" to its opinion in Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 
171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981), and noted that "[b]oth pathways should 
lead to the same result." See Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 925 n.9, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 353 n.9, 7f12 
P.2d at 511 n.9. In practice, however, California courts have followed the A & M Pro­
duce analysis. See, e.g., Samura v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1284, 
1296-97, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 27-28 (Ct. App. 1993); U.S. Roofing, Inc. v. Credit Alliance 
Corp., 228 Cal. App. 3d 1431, 1448, 279 Cal. Rptr. 533, 543 (Ct. App. 1991); Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 758, 767-78, 259 Cal. Rptr. 
789, 794-95 (Ct. App. 1989). 
158. See, e.g., C & H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 163 Cal. App. 3d 1055, 1064, 
211 Cal. Rptr. 765. 770 (Ct. App. 1984) ("As the policies clearly so provided, and in 
view of the fact that plaintiffs do not deny that C & H was furnished the policies, we 
reject plaintiffs' claim that they were unaware of that provision."); West v. Henderson, 
227 Cal. App. 3d 1578, 1586-87, 278 Cal. Rptr. 570, 574-75 (Ct. App. 1991) (limitation 
provision in lease was not oppressive as to plaintiff because "[k ]nowing her own inexpe­
rience, she signed the lease without consulting an attol1ley (despite a prominent admo­
nition in the lease to do so)"). 
159. See, e.g., Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 
674, 684, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 393, 798 P.2d 1230, 1236 (Cal. 1990) ("When a clause in an 
insurance policy is authorized by statute, it is deemed consistent with public policy as 
established by the Legislature."); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. 
App. 3d 604, 609, 258 Cal. Rptr. 413, 416 (Ct. App. 1989) ("[i]t makes no difference 
whether the limitations provision in question is statutory or contractual. Not only . . .  is 
there no fundamental difference between the two, but also, the one-year policy period 
of limitations in insurance contracts is specifically authorized by statute."). 
HeinOnline -- 26 Sw. U. L. Rev. 40 1996-1997
40 SOU THWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
visions from an analysis of the reasonableness of the provision to 
the broader analysis of the conscionability of the provision. "160 
Although the California courts have upheld the validity of 
contractual limitation clauses in general, and the limitation-of­
suit provision of Insurance Code section 2071 in particular, two 
important questions remain. First, to what extent does a con­
tractual limitation provision apply to causes of action for breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing? Second, to what 
extent may the contractual limitation provision change the 
otherwise applicable rule of accrual? 
2. Applicability to Bad Faith Actions 
There is a split of authority regarding the extent to which a 
contractual limitation clause applies to a claim for breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Although the majority 
of California cases hold that an action for breach of the implied 
covenant is barred whenever suit on the contract would be 
barred, two California cases have held that a bad-faith suit may 
be maintained notwithstanding a contractual limitation-of-suit 
provision. 
In Murphy v. Allstate Insurance CO. ,161 the plaintiff home­
owners alleged that Allstate conspired with Golden West Con­
struction Company and others to defraud plaintiffs after their 
house was substantially damaged by fire. Specifically, they al-
160. West, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 1585-86, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 574. Although the statutory 
language indicates that a clause must be unconscionable "at the time it was made," in 
practice courts analyze the effect of the provision as applied. See, e.g., West, 227 Cal. 
App. 3d at 1588, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 576 (although contractual provision limiting defenses 
as wel1 as claims might be "unjustifiably inequitable" in a hypothetical situation, it is 
"irrelevant to this case because it is not being asserted against West"). This is consistent 
with the statutory language providing that the court "may so limit the application of any 
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result." CAL. CIv. CoDE § 1670.5 
(West 1985) (emphasis added). 
161. 83 Cal. App. 3d 38, 47, 147 Cal. Rptr. 565, 572 (Ct. App. 1978). 
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leged that Allstate arranged with the other defendants to pre­
serve and repair the damaged home, and represented that they 
were qualified to do the work.162 In fact, Golden West was not a 
licensed contractor, and plaintiffs alleged that "neither it nor the 
other persons and firms were competent or qualified to do the 
work for which they were engaged,"163 and that the work was 
done so poorly "that both the home and the furniture and the 
furnishings were further damaged."I64 Plaintiffs further alleged 
that after the amount of the loss was fixed by an appraiser se­
lected by the parties, Allstate filed an interpleader action to re­
solve the claims of the contractors to the proceeds which delayed 
payment for nearly two years.165 Plaintiffs pleaded causes of ac­
tion for fraud, conspiracy to defraud, two counts of bad faith 
breach of the implied covenant, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.166 
Construing the statutory phrase "[n]o suit or action on this 
policy for the recovery of any claim," the court held that the 
statute only applied to "a claim for a loss covered by the pol­
icy,"167 and that "[n]one of plaintiff's alleged causes of action are 
actions 'on the policy' of insurance. "168 The court noted that the 
162. Id. at 41-42, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 569. 
163. Id. at 42, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 569. 
164. Id., 147 Cal. Rptr. at 569. 
165. Id. at 43, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 570. 
166. Id. at 43-44, 47-48, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 572, 573. 
167. Id. at 44, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 571. Murphy cited Stockton Combined Harvester 
and Agric. Works v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 98 Cal. 557, 33 P. 633 (Cal. 1893), a California 
Supreme Court case in which the insurer and insured had submitted a claim to binding 
arbitration. Stockton sued to collect the award, and the defendant tried to set up the 
limitation of action clause in the policy as a defense. The Stockton court held: "The 
distinction between . . .  an action upon an award fixing the liability of an insurer [under 
an insurance contract, and a cause of action upon a policy of insurance] . . .  is marked 
and important. . . . In such a case, the action is not upon the policy, but upon the agree­
ment to pay. " Stockton, 98 Cal. at 569, 33 P. at 634. 
168. Murphy, 83 Cal. App. 3d at 46, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 572. 
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third and fourth counts "purport to state one or more causes of 
action for bad faith, that is, unjustified refusal to pay or pro­
longed delay in paying legitimate claims under the policy."169 
Allstate argued that "plaintiffs' bad faith claim is based upon al­
leged breaches of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing 
which arises only because of the contract of insurance. 'mo The 
court rejected this argument: 
[T]here is a significant difference between "arising out of the 
contractual relationship" and "on the policy . . . .  " Much of the 
conduct complained of in the third and fourth causes of action 
occurred long after the fire loss and related to the repair and 
restoration of plaintiffs' home and personal property and the em­
ployment of persons and firms to do that work, [and] the institu­
tion and prosecution of the interpleader action. Here again, the 
damages claimed were not caused by any risk insured against 
under the policy and were not recoverable under the pOlicy.l71 
Murphy was followed by Frazier v. Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance CO. ,112 in which the insurer denied the plaintiff's claim 
under a life insurance policy on the grounds that she had not 
proved that the decedent had not committed suicide. The Fra­
zier court held that "the policy time limitation, even if reason­
able, does not bar this action based on the hybrid contractual 
nature of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."173 
The court relied in part on Murphy, and in part on the ground 
that the bad-faith cause of action could not be deemed to accrue 
until the insurer denied the claim: 
The trial judge held that plaintiff's breach of contract claim was 
barred by the time limitations of the contract, but that since her 
cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
169. Id. at 47, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 573. 
170. Id. at 48, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 573. 
171. Id. at 49, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 574. 
172. 169 Cal. App. 3d 90, 98, 214 Cal. Rptr. 883, 886 (Q. App. 1985). 
173. Id. at 104, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 891. 
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dealing did not accrue until the claim on the double indemnity 
portion of the contract was denied, . . .  the action was timely filed 
under the policy for breach of that covenant . . . .  [A]s found by 
the trial judge, Mrs. Frazier's action does not commence until 
Metropolitan denies her claim on the ground of suicide. Prior to 
such time Mrs. Frazier has a right (so far as the policy limitation 
is concerned) to sit back and wait until denial of a claim before 
urging bad faith. Because it is not until Metropolitan actually 
denies the claim on the ground of suicide that Mrs. Frazier can 
actually ascertain whether or not Metropolitan has acted in bad 
faith.17 4 
43 
In contrast to Murphy and Frazier, Lawrence v. Western 
Mutual Insurance CO. l7S held that "the one-year commencement 
of suit provision also precludes Lawrence from recovery on the 
cause of action for alleged tortious bad faith in handling his 
claim because of purported misrepresentations in the policy con­
cerning coverage."l76 In Lawrence, the plaintiff suffered exten­
sive damage to his house due to inadequate compaction of the 
fill beneath the foundationY7 In late 1983  and early 1984, the 
plaintiff incurred expenses of $250,000 for geological reports and 
correction of the problemYs However, Lawrence did not pres­
ent a claim to his insurer at that time, because the policy con­
tained an exclusion for earth movement.l79 In July 1985, 
Lawrence consulted an attorney, who advised him that since the 
settlement was caused by the negligence of a third party, the loss 
might be covered despite the exclusion.lso Lawrence submitted 
174. Id. at 103, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 890. 
175. 204 Cal. App. 3d 565, 251 Cal. Rptr. 319 (Ct. App. 1988). 
176. Id. at 574-75, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 324. 
177. Id. at 569, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 320. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 569-70, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 320-21. 
180. Id. at 570, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 321. 
HeinOnline -- 26 Sw. U. L. Rev. 44 1996-1997
44 SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
a claim on July 15, 1985, which was denied on January 7, 1986, 
and Lawrence filed suit on January 28, 1986.181 
Lawrence argued that "inception of the loss" incorporated a 
discovery rule of accrual, and that therefore the contractual limi­
tation period did not begin to run until "the insured knew or 
should have known that a loss has occurred which is covered by 
his insurance policy."182 The court disagreed, holding that under 
the discovery rule, "[i]t is the occurrence of some . . .  cognizable 
event rather than knowledge of its legal significance that starts 
the running of the statute of limitations. "183 Therefore, since 
Lawrence had obtained reports in December 1983 concerning 
the cause of the damage, he was placed on inquiry notice "from 
which he could have surmised that his loss was due to the negli­
gence of a third party. "184 
In holding that Lawrence's bad-faith claim was subject to 
the contractual limitation period, the court attempted to distin­
guish the prior cases: 
Lawrence's allegation of tortious bad faith relates to the com­
plete denial of the claim on the underlying policy. In both Mur­
phy and Frazier, a subsequent event occurred after the initial 
policy coverage was triggered which was the basis for the cause of 
action. The subsequent event related to the policy, but either 
was not a claim directly on the policy (Murphy) or was a claim 
which arose after the insurer paid on the policy but did so not to 
the satisfaction of the beneficiary of the policy (Frazier). Here, 
Lawrence's cause of action for bad faith in purportedly misrepre-
181. ld. 
182. ld. at 571-72, 25� Cal. Rptr. at 322. 
183. [d. at 573, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 323, (quoting McGee v. Weinberg, 97 Cal. App. 3d 
798, 804, 159 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90 (Ct. App. 1979» . See also Gutierrez v. Mofid, 39 Cal. 3d 
892, 898, 218 Cal. Rptr. 313, 316, 705 P.2d 886, 889 (Cal. 1985) (cause of action for 
medical malpractice accrues even though "plaintiff is ignorant of his legal remedy or the 
legal theories underlying his cause of action."). 
184. Lawrence, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 572, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 322-23. 
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senting the scope of coverage in the policy is fundamentally a 
claim on the policy and is thus time barred.1 85 
45 
Shortly after Lawrence was decided, the same conclusion 
was reached in Abari v. State Farm Fire and Casualty CO.186 In 
Abari, the plaintiff alleged that he first noticed cracks in his 
home in 1979, and that after renting the property for several 
years, he observed more severe cracks and damage when he re­
turned in September 1984.187 Abari consulted an attorney and 
submitted a claim to State Farm on January 21, 1985, then filed 
suit on January 23, 1985.188 The court refused to credit Abari's 
argument that he was not put on inquiry notice in 1979, because 
Abari had failed to plead that he "was not alerted to the gravity 
of the damage" at that time, despite having been given two op­
portunities to amend his pleading to include such an allega­
tion.189 The court in Abari also attempted to distinguish 
Murphy: 
In Murphy, the plaintiffs complained of wrongful conduct by the 
insurer subsequent to their fire loss, and alleged unjustified re­
fusal to pay or prolonged delay in paying legitimate claims under 
the policy. As such, the bad faith "damages claimed were not 
caused by any risk insured against under the policy and were not 
recoverable under the policy." Contrarily, Abari alleged in both 
the bad faith and unfair practices counts that "[b]y reason of de­
fendants STATE FARM . . .  breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, plaintiff has been and continues to be damaged 
in an amount equal to the benefits payable under the policies, 
plus interest thereon." Abari's pleading thus reveals his bad faith 
and unfair practices claims are a transparent attempt to recover 
185. Id. at 575, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 324-25. 
186. 205 Cal. App. 3d 530, 252 Cal. Rptr. 565 (Ct. App. 1988). 
187. Id. at 533, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 566. 
188. ld. at 532-33, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 565. 
189. Id. at 535, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 567. 
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on the policy, notwithstanding his failure to commence suit within 
one year of accrual.l90 
Subsequent cases have followed Lawrence and Abari in holding 
that a bad faith claim is barred by the expiration of the contrac­
tual limitation period "where the gravamen of the bad faith ac­
tion pertained to the insurer's handling of the initial claim for 
loss. "191 This view is also supported by the California Supreme 
Court's opinion in Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance v. Su­
perior Court,l92 in which the court, in dicta, quoted Abari's hold­
ing on this point with apparent approval.193 
But the issue will not go away, because Lawrence's and 
Abari's attempts to distinguish Murphy and Frazier are ex­
tremely unpersuasive. Lawrence gives no reason why the partial 
denial of the plaintiff's claim in bad faith in Frazier should take 
the cause of action outside the contractual limitation period, 
while the complete denial of the claim in Lawrence should not.194 
Similarly, although Murphy, unlike Frazier, at least involved 
190. ld. at 536, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 567-68 (citations omitted). 
191. Velasquez v. 'Ii'uck Ins. Exch., 1 Cal. App. 4th 712, 720, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d I, 5 (Ct. 
App. 1991); see also Magnolia Square Homeowners Ass'n v. Safeco Ins. Co., 221 Cal. 
App. 3d 1049, 1063, 271 Cal. Rptr. I, 9 (Ct. App. 1990). 
192. 51 Cal. 3d 674, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal. 1990). 
193. ld. at 686, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 394-95, 798 P.2d at 1237. However, despite its 
apparent approval of Abari, the Prudential opinion largely eliminates the problem 
which Murphy and Frazier attempted to address by changing the rules of accrual and 
tolling with respect to contract and bad faith claims. See infra notes 206-30 and accom­
panying text. 
194. See Prieto v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 225 Cal. App. 3d 1188, 1194-95, 275 
Cal. Rptr. 362, 365 (Ct. App. 1990) ("in both Frazier and the instant case the insurer's 
alleged misconduct involved breach of a primary obligation to pay policy benefits."). 
Because Prieto recognized that the claim in Frazier was essentially identical, it chose 
instead to repudiate Frazier: 
[W]e find neither reason nor authority to signify that a plaintiff's election to seek 
redress under the implied covenant rather than the express contract should nUllify 
the legislatively prescribed limitation for actions that are "on- the policy" because 
grounded in a failure to pay benefits that are due under the policy and indeed con­
stitute its very reason for being. 
ld. at 1195, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 365-66. 
HeinOnline -- 26 Sw. U. L. Rev. 47 1996-1997
1996] UNRAVELING THE TANGLED WEB 47 
conduct in addition to the denial of benefits, both Lawrence and 
Abari fail to explain why the breach of a "duty not to withhold 
unreasonably payments due under a policy"195 in Murphy should 
be taken outside the contractual limitation period simply be­
cause the insurer allegedly conspired with third parties to avoid 
its contractual obligation, rather than denying the claim outright, 
as in Lawrence and Abari.196 
The key to understanding this dilemma is recognizing that 
the contractual limitation provision modifies the date of accrual 
as well as the applicable limitation period. Thus, the possibility 
foreseen in Frazier that the limitation period might expire before 
the cause of action accrues under otherwise-applicable law197 is 
not limited to bad faith claims, but would also apply to ordinary 
claims to collect the benefits due "on the policy." This anomaly 
could occur for one of two reasons. First, the insurer could delay 
responding to the plaintiff's claim until after the contractual limi­
tation period had expired.198 This would not happen under gen­
eral accrual principles, because a "breach" would not occur until 
the insurer denied the claim or the deadline for responding had 
195. Murphy, 83 Cal. App. 3d at 49, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 574. 
196. It should be noted that this argument applies only to the bad-faith claim in 
Murphy, which necessarily rested on the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal­
ing, and therefore arguably should be considered a claim "on the policy." The other 
causes of action in Murphy were tort claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emo­
tional distress, neither of which required or depended on the existence of a contractual 
duty. See Murphy, 83 Cal. App. 3d at 46-47, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 572-73 (fraud claim); iii. 
at 49-50, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 574-75 (emotional distress claim). 
197. See Frazier, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 103, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 890. 
198. See Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 692-
93, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 399, 798 P.2d at 1242 (Cal. 1990) ("It was not until September 1987 
that plaintiffs claim was denied unequivocally. Thus, if the one-year suit provision 
were literally applied, plaintiffs suit would have been untimely before the insurer de­
nied coverage."); see also Frazier, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 103, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 890. Simi­
larly, in Murphy the insurer caused the payment of the claim to be delayed nearly two 
years while it pursued an interpleader action, allegedly in bad faith. Murphy, 83 Cal. 
App. 3d at 42-43, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 570. 
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passed.199 Contractual limitation provisions, however, seem to 
measure the period from the happening of the contingent event 
("inception of the loss"). Second, if the contractual limitation 
period begins running upon the happening of the contingent 
event, rather than upon the discovery of the cause of action, bad­
faith conduct by the insurer subsequent to denial of the insured's 
claim might not occur, or reasonably might not be discovered, 
until after the contractual limitation period has expired. Barring 
suit in circumstances such as these would be absurd. 
This anomaly could be resolved in one of three ways. First, 
courts could hold that the limitation provision in the policy is 
unconscionable as applied unless it permits the plaintiff a reason­
able time within which to sue. If the provision is unconsciona­
ble, the court could refuse to enforce it and instead apply the 
default limitation periods discussed in Part II, above. While this 
would be consistent with the general test for .the validity of con­
tractual limitation provisions, it is difficult, to say the least, to 
find a legal basis for holding that a provision authorized by stat­
ute is void for unconscionability. 
Second, in order to provide a legal basis for holding the stat­
utory provision invalid, courts could hold that the statute, as ap­
plied in certain cases, is an unconstitutional deprivation of due 
process. For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court has held 
that "[ d]ue process requires a limitations statute to provide a 
reasonable period within which an accrued right may be exer­
cised. "200 The court analogized the situation to that in which the 
Legislature passes a statute that retroactively shortens the appli-
199. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text. 
200. Garcia v. La Farge, 893 P.2d 428, 437 (N.M. 1995); see also 5 RONALD ANDER­
SON, ANDERSON ON TIlE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725:11 (3d ed. 1985 & Rev. 
1994) ("Questions of constitutionality may also be engendered by a disparity in fixing 
the beginning date for the running of the statute of limitations period."). 
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cable limitation period.201 In the latter situation, California 
courts have consistently held that the new statute must be inter­
preted to allow a "reasonable time to sue" for claims that were 
not yet expired at the time the act was passed, in order to avoid 
constitutional problems.202 However, unlike New Mexico, the 
majority of jurisdictions have resisted extending such an argu­
ment to all statutes of limitation.203 
The third solution is to attack the causes of the potential 
problem: unreasonable delay by the insurer in responding to the 
plaintiff's claim, and the accrual of the contractual limitation pe­
riod before discovery of the cause of action. The legal basis for 
this solution will be discussed in the following section. 
B. Accrual on Discovery and Equitable Tolling of Limitation 
Period 
As noted above, the California Standard Form Fire Insur­
ance Policy provides for a one-year limitation period commenc-
201. Garcia, 893 P.2d at 437. ("It is no less arbitrary when an existing statute of 
repose is applied to bar a claim accruing near the end of the limitations period than 
when a newly enacted limitations period is applied to a cause of action existing at the 
time of the enactment."). 
202. See, e.g., Brown v. Bleiberg, 32 Cal. 3d 426, 437, 186 Cal. Rptr. 228, 233-34, 651 
P.2d 815, 820-21 (Cal. 1982) (citations and footnotes omitted): 
The 1970 enactment and the 1975 amendment [of CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 340.5] 
. . .  could not be given retroactive effect so as to wipe out plaintiffs claim, but the 
Legislature may restrict the period of limitations on a pending claim so long as the 
plaintiff is given "a reasonable time in which to sue." A statute shortening the stat­
ute of limitations may be interpreted prospectively to avoid constitutional problems 
which would attend retroactivity. 
203. See, e.g., Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318, 321 (10th Cir. 1984) (" [Statutes 
of limitation] sometimes expire before a claimant has sustained any injury, . . .  or before 
he knows he has sustained an injury . . . . If the limitation period is otherwise reason­
able, a claimant is not thereby deprived of his right to due process.") (quoting Jewson v. 
Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 411 (8th Cir. 1982» ; accord, Admire Bank & nust v. City of 
Emporia, 829 P.2d 578, 586 (Kan. 1992); 5 RONALD ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE 
UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE § 2-275:11 (3d ed. 1985 & Rev. 1994) ("The courts have 
not been troubled by the theoretical considerations discussed above and have found 
statute of limitations provisions constitutional. "). 
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ing upon "inception of the loss. "204 Many contractual limitation 
clauses are similar.20s This provision was derived from the New 
York Standard Fire Insurance Policy, which originally provided 
that suit must be brought "within twelve months next after the 
fire," but was amended to the present language "as insurance 
coverage was expanded to cover more than fire (e.g., theft, light­
ning and other property damage) . . . . "206 
If interpreted literally, this language would commence the 
contractual limitation period upon the happening of the contin­
gent event for which coverage is provided. In many cases, such a 
provision would cause little difficulty; for example, the date of 
"inception of the loss" is easily determined in the case of a fire 
or life insurance policy. When other types of property damages 
are at issue, however, the date of "inception of the loss" may not 
be so clear. For example, in the case of progressive property 
damage caused by construction defects, the wrongful act may oc­
cur long before any damage occurs, and the damage may not 
then be discovered for a long time. Thus, unless "inception of 
the loss" is defined in accordance with the discovery rule of ac­
crual, the shortened one-year period may well expire before the 
insured is aware of his or her cause of action. 
204. CAL. INS. CoDE § 2071 (West 1993). 
205. See, e.g., Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 
674, 680 n.2, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 390 n.2, 798 P.2d 1230, 1233
'
n.2 (Cal. 1991) (policy 
provision barring suit "unless commenced within twelve months next after the happen­
ing of the loss" (emphasis added); but holding that "[w]e perceive no legal difference 
between 'inception' and 'happening' for purposes of resolving the questions 
presented."); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. App. 3d 604, 610, 
258 Cal. Rptr. 413, 416 (Ct. App. 1989) ("the differences between 'occurrence' and 
'inception of the loss' are trivial; if anything . . .  the policy provision is an improvement 
in the direction of plain English."); Magnolia Square Homeowners Ass'n v. Safeco Ins. 
Co., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1049, 1059 n.3, 271 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 n.3 (Ct. App. 1990) ("No less 
trivial is the difference between 'inception of the loss' and 'loss occurs."'). 
206. Prudential, 51 Cal. 3d at 682-83, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 392, 798 P.2d at 1235. 
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This problem has been partially alleviated by the California 
Supreme Court's holding in Prudential-LMI Commercial Insur­
ance v. Superior Court207 that for first-party insurance claims 
concerning progressive property damage, "the one-year suit pro­
vision begins to run on the date of inception of the loss, defined 
as that point in time when appreciable damage occurs and is or 
should be known to the insured, such that a reasonable insured 
would be aware that his notification duty under the policy has 
been triggered. "208 The court thus approved of the holdings in 
Lawrence and Abari that "'inception of the loss' means that 
point in time at which appreciable damage occurs so that a rea­
sonable insured would be on notice of a potentially insured 
loss."209 Under Prudential, contingent events which have a defi­
nite date of occurrence (such as a fire) will be presumed to place 
the insured on inquiry notice and will commence the running of 
the contractual limitation period;210 but contingent events which 
by their nature are difficult to discover will not trigger the con­
tractual limitation period until the insured is on inquiry notice 
concerning the event. 
Using the discovery rule, however, only solves part of the 
problem. Even if the shortened limitation period commences 
upon the discovery of the contingent event, another problem 
may arise. Under the default rules of accrual, the cause of action 
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
207. 51 Cal. 3d 674, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal. 1990). 
208. [d. at 678, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 389, 798 P.2d at 1232; see also id. at 686, 274 Cal. 
Rptr. at 395, 798 P.2d at 1238 ("We agree that 'inception of the loss' should be deter­
mined by reference to reasonable discovery of the loss and not necessarily turn on the 
occurrence of the physical event causing the loss."). 
209. [d. at 685, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 394, 798 P.2d at 1237. 
210. See, e.g., Prieto v. State Fann Fire & Cas. Co., 225 Cal. App. 3d 1188, 1196, 275 
Cal. Rptr. 362, 366 (Ct. App. 1990) ("The statute still must be deemed to have begun 
running on the date of the fire, because the complaint alleges a sufficiently disastrous 
loss, at which plaintiffs were personally present, to alert them immediately."). 
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would not accrue until the insurer denied the claim, or at least 
until the deadline for paying benefits under the policy had 
passed.211 If the limitation period starts running earlier, how­
ever, it is possible that the one-year period will expire before the 
insurer denies the claim, thereby terminating the insured's rights 
even before they would have accrued under the discovery 
rule.212 Indeed, the insurer could even delay processing the 
claim on purpose, in the hope that the insured will neglect to file 
suit while waiting for a response. 
A situation somewhat similar to the latter was presented in 
Bollinger v. National Fire Insurance CO.213 There, the plaintiff 
sued the insurer to recover for a covered fire loss. The defend­
ant insurer "requested and obtained numerous continuances and 
extensions of time, thereby delaying the time of trial" for one 
year; then it moved for a nonsuit on the ground that the action 
was prematurely filed.214 The trial court erroneously granted the 
motion and dismissed the action; but instead of appealing the 
trial court's ruling, the plaintiff refiled the action in another 
county after the shortened limitation period had passed.215 
Plaintiff alleged that the action would have been filed on time 
but for the defendant's intentional delay in raising the issue that 
the previous action was premature.216 
Faced with an egregious example of alleged intentional con­
duct in bad faith?1? but unable to change the date of accrual 
211. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text. 
212. See, e.g., Prudential, 51 Cal. 3d at 692-93, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 399, 798 P.2d at 1242 
("Thus, if the one-year suit provision were literally applied, plaintiffs suit would have 
been untimely before the insurer denied coverage."). 
213. 25 Cal. 2d 399, 154 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1944). 
214. Id. at 402, 154 P.2d at 401. 
215. Id. at 402-03, 154 P.2d at 401. At that time, INS. CODE § 2071 contained a 
fifteen-month limitation provision. Id. at 402, 154 P.2d at 401. 
216. Id. at 403, 154 P.2d at 401. 
217. See id. at 407-08, 154 P.2d at 404 (citations omitted): 
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contained in the statutory insurance policy, the court created a 
novel solution: the doctrine of equitable tolling. First, it noted 
that virtually all jurisdictions have held that statutory tolling pro­
visions which were "designed to prevent technical forfeitures 
under statutes of limitation also apply to the limitation period 
incorporated by statute into every insurance pOlicy."218 Next, it 
held that Code of Civil Procedure section 355219 should be "sup­
plemented by judicial construction and applied beyond its literal 
language to accomplish its purpose."220 Finally, the court boldly 
asserted that "[i]n any event this court is not powerless to formu­
late rules of procedure where justice demands it."221 
Although the doctrine of equitable tolling rests upon a 
questionable legal basis,222 its flexible dimensions make it attrac­
tive to courts seeking practical solutions to limitation problems. 
Thus, equitable tolling was used in the insurance context as the 
basis for the holding in Lambert v. Commonwealth Land Title 
Insurance CO.223 that although the duty to defend accrues when 
the insurer refuses the insured's tender of defense, the limitation 
period is tolled until the underlying action is terminated by a 
final judgment.224 Similarly, when faced with the issue of accrual 
[Ilt is clear to us that defendant's conduct furnished the occasion for the delay and 
that it cannot take advantage of a situation which was of its own creation. Under 
the circumstances of the present case it would be manifestly unjust for this court to 
prevent a trial on the merits . . .  by enforcing the fifteen-month limitation period 
when the prior action was filed promptly and long before the period expired. 
218. ld. at 408, 154 P.2d at 404. 
219. In 1955, that section provided: "If an action is commenced within the time 
prescribed therefor, and a judgment therein for the plaintiff be reversed on appeal, the 
plaintiff . . .  may commence a new action within one year after the reversal." ld. at 409, 
154 P;2d at 404 (emphasis added). 
220. ld. , 154 P.2d at 405. 
221. ld. at 410, 154 P.2d at 405. 
222. See generally, Simultaneous Litigation, supra note 107 (describing objections to 
applying equitable tolling to legal malpractice actions and responses to these 
objections). 
223. 53 Cal. 3d 1072, 282 Cal. Rptr. 445, 811 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1991). 
224. ld. at 1080, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 449-50, 811 P.2d at 741-42. 
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for progressive property damage claims in Prudential, the Cali­
fornia Supreme Court used the doctrine of equitable tolling to 
hold that "this limitation period should be equitably tolled from 
the time the insured files a timely notice, pursuant to policy no­
tice provisions, to the time the insurer formally denies the claim 
in writing. "225 In so holding, the court emphasized the policy 
considerations in favor of the doctrine: 
[T]he principle of equitable tolling presents several advantages in 
eliminating the unfair results that often occur in progressive 
property damage cases. First, it allows the claims process to func­
tion effectively, instead of requiring the insured to file suit before 
the claim has been investigated and determined by the insurer. 
Next, it protects the reasonable expectations of the insured by 
requiring the insurer to investigate the claim without later invok­
ing a technical rule that often results in an unfair forfeiture of 
policy benefits. . . .  Third, a doctrine of equitable tolling will fur­
ther our policy of encouraging settlement between insurers and 
insureds, and will discourage unnecessary bad faith suits that are 
often the only recourse for indemnity if the insurer denies cover­
age after the limitation period has expired. . . . Equitable tolling 
is also consistent with the policies underlying the claim and limi­
tation periods - e.g., the insurer is entitled to receive prompt 
notice of a claim and the insured is penalized for waiting too long 
after discovery to make a claim. For example, if an insured waits 
11 months after discovering the loss to make his claim, he will 
have only 1 month to file his action after the claim is denied 
before it is time-barred under section 2071.226 
Thus, in one opinion, the California Supreme Court re­
solved four major problems concerning the applicability of the 
statute of limitation for breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. First, the court reaffirmed the principle 
that contractual limitation provisions were valid and enforceable 
'''as long as the limitation is not so unreasonable as to show im-
225. Prudential, 51 Cal. 3d at 678, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 389, 798 P.2d at 1232. 
226. Id. at 692, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 398-99, 798 P.2d at 1241-42 (citations omitted). 
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position or undue advantage. "'227 Second, it endorsed the hold­
ing of Abari that the "rule that [the] one-year suit provision does 
not apply to bad faith suits [is] inapplicable when the insured's 
bad faith action is [a] 'transparent attempt to recovery on the 
policy, notwithstanding his failure to commence suit within one 
year of accrual."'228 Third, it held that "inception of the loss" 
should be interpreted in accordance with the discovery rule of 
accrual.229 Fourth, it held that the doctrine of equitable tolling 
should be applied to toll the limitation period from the time the 
insured files the claim until it is denied by the insurer?30 As one 
subsequent court stated: 
Significantly, Prudential's rules of flexible accrual and equitable 
tolling will provide for policyholders under section 2071 much 
the same disposition as did Frazier. Thus, an insured who makes 
a timely claim will thereafter "ha[ve] a right (so far as the policy 
limitation is concerned) to sit back and wait until denial of claim" 
before the statute begins running again. But the statute still will 
have commenced running, as its terms require, upon inception of 
the loss (as defined in Prudential).231 
IV . CONCLUSION 
The so-called "hybrid" nature of the cause of action for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was 
227. Id. at 683, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 393, 798 P.2d at 1236 (quoting C & H Foods Co. v. 
Hartford Ins. Co., 163 Cal. App. 3d 1055, 1064, 211 Cal. Rptr. 765, 769 (Ct. App. 1984» . 
228. Id. at 692, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 398-99, 798 P.2d at 1241-42. 
229. Id. at 678, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 389, 798 P.2d at 1232. 
230. Id. at 678, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 389, 798 P.2d at 1232. In so hOlding, the court 
observed that "[o]ne commentator has called it 'unconscionable' to permit the limita­
tion period to run while the insured is pursuing its rights in the claims process," id. at 
690, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 397, 798 P.2d at 1240 (citing 18A GEORGE J. CoUCH, CoUCH ON 
INSURANCE § 75:88 (2d ed. 1983», thus connecting the tolling rationale to the modern 
standard for assessing the validity of contractual limitation of suit provisions. See supra 
notes 153-59 and accompanying text. 
231. Prieto v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 225 Cal. App. 3d 1188, 1196, 275 Cal. 
Rptr. 362, 366 (Ct. App. 1990) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
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the product not only of overlapping legal theories of recovery 
but also of attempts to extend or shorten the limitation period 
within which claims for emotional distress and punitive damages 
could be · brought. Now that the California Supreme Court has 
firmly re-established the contractual nature of the implied cove­
nant in non-insurance cases, the applicable limitation principles 
are more clear. The limitation periods and rules of accrual that 
apply to contract claims generally should govern the cause of ac­
tion for breach of the implied covenant outside the insurance 
context. For actions for breach of the implied covenant in insur­
ance contracts, the doctrine of election of remedies applies only 
in the absence or invalidity of contractual modification. The vast 
majority of such actions are subject to contractual limitation-of­
suit provisions, which are now governed by a new set of rules 
incorporating the principles of discovery accrual and equitable 
tolling. These principles should bring a measure of stability to 
what has been a contentious and complicated question of statu­
tory interpretation. 
